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[The Report] tells the largely untold human story of what
happened to detainees in our custody when the Commander-in-
Chief and those under him authorized a systematic regime of
torture. This story is not only written in words: it is scrawled for 
the rest of these individual[s’] lives on their bodies and minds. 
–Major General Anthony Taguba1 
I. INTRODUCTION: TORTURE AS A CLOAKED STATE PRACTICE
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 2 (MCA) marked the high tide 
and endgame for hiding torture.3  Its unraveling did more to uncover the 
 1. Dan Froomkin, General Accuses WH of War Crimes, WASH. POST, June 18, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2008/06/18/BL2008061801546.html. 
2. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 
17, 2006), enacting Chapter 47A of title 10 United States Code (codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 948a–950w and other sections of titles 10, 18, 28, and 42). 
3. I am not the first to suggest that the Administration attempted to hide torture. 
See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism, and International 
Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 335, 337–39 (2003).  See Adam Zagorin, One Life Inside Gitmo, 
TIME, Mar. 13, 2006, at 20 (quoting Hofstra law professor Eric Friedman) for a discussion 
concerning the Military Commissions Act.  “It would be an outrage if evidence being used to
hold prisoners was extracted by unconscionable methods and that fact did not come to 
light in a court of law.”  Id.  Furthermore, there can no longer be doubt that what the 
administration euphemistically called “alternative interrogation techniques” involved torture 
by any reasonable definition of the term.  The highly credible confidential report of 
February 14, 2007 by the International Committee of the Red Cross concluded, “the ill-
treatment to which [fourteen high value detainees] were subjected while held in the CIA 
60
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Bush administration’s secret interrogation practices than did the political 
change in Washington. International and domestic backlash against the
government’s embrace of harsh interrogation techniques, frequently 
rising to the level of torture,4 also played a role.  However, the Supreme
Court’s decisions ending in Boumediene v. Bush5 played the decisive 
role. Boumediene, and the Supreme Court decisions that led up to it,
made inevitable that which politics had left contingent and reversible.  It 
also provided legal and political cover. 
Through the MCA, the Bush Administration sought to prosecute non-
citizen detainees outside of the United States using secret, coerced, and 
hearsay evidence6 without interference from U.S. habeas courts.7 
Appeals were limited.8  The MCA also left a loophole for the use of 
evidence obtained by outright torture,9 and rendered evidence of torture 
immune from disclosure.10  If the Administration had succeeded, it could 
have hidden, or at least insulated, its coercive interrogation program.
Because of Boumediene, these non-citizen detainees gained access to
program, either singly or in combination, constituted torture.”  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED 
CROSS, ICRCREPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF FOURTEEN “HIGH VALUE DETAINEES” IN CIA
CUSTODY 26 (2007), available at http://www.nybooks.com/icrc-report.pdf  [hereinafter ICRC
REPORT]. Finally, memoranda issued by the Office of Legal Counsel between 2002 and 
2005 leave little doubt that waterboarding and other harsh techniques were used in
interrogating detainees.  Sam Stein, Bush Torture Memos Released By Obama: See The 
Complete Documents, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 16, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2009/04/16/ bush-torture-memos-releas_n_187867.html. 
4. Commentary following the release of the Red Cross report has called U.S. 
interrogation practices “torture” and called for criminal prosecution. ICRC REPORT, supra
note 3.  Eugene Robinson, commentator for The Washington Post, for example argues: 
“I have believed all along that we urgently need to conduct a thorough investigation into
the Bush administration’s moral and legal transgressions.  Now I am convinced that some
kind of “truth commission” process isn’t enough.  Torture—even the torture of evil men—is a
crime.  It deserves not just to be known, but to be punished.”  Eugene Robinson, Crimes That
Deserve Punishment, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2009, at A17. 
5. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
6. See generally, Military Comm’n R. Evid. 304 (the Military Commission Rules 
of Evidence are located in Part III of the Manual for Military Commissions (2007), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/MANUAL%20FOR%20MILITARY%20COMMISSIONS
%202007%20signed.pdf; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 
3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2608 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 949(a), (d)). 
7. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 
2600, 2635–36 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241). 
8. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 
2600, 2608 (2006) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950(g)). 
9. See infra Part IX. 
10. Id.
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U.S. courts, thus making disclosure of some of the most secret details11 
of these harsh and sometime torturous interrogations inevitable.12 While
not likely,13 this could expose complicit officials to civil or even criminal 
prosecution.14  The stakes remain high. 
11. Of course Boumediene will not directly affect the assertions of the state secrets 
privilege in civil cases, which are being filed in cases arising out of the Pentagon’s 
extraordinary rendition program.  The Obama administration has continued to assert the 
privilege using the same arguments as the former Bush administration. See, e.g., Ronald 
Goldfarb, State Secrets? Let the Courts Weigh In., WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2009, at B2; 
Nedra Pickler & Matt Apuzzo, Obama Backs Bush: No Rights for Bagram Prisoners, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 21, 2009, http://www.infowars.com/obama-backs-bush-no-rights-
for-bagram-prisoners/; Bob Egelko, Obama’s Justice Dept. in Court over Challenge to
Bush Wiretap Policy; National Security, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 13, 2009, at A6; Bob Egelko,
Hearing in Rendition Case Could Reveal Obama’s Policy, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 9, 2009, at 
A1. The U.S. government has vigorously asserted the state secrets privilege in reply to 
the civil lawsuits flowing out of the government’s extraordinary rendition program, 
suggesting that much about this program remains secret. See, e.g., El-Masri v. Tenet, 
437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
128 S. Ct. 373 (2007).  Had the courts continued to sustain the privilege, discovery of 
torture through civil litigation would be difficult, if not impossible. However, in
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal rejected the 
administration’s broad assertions of state secrets privilege and remanded that case back
to the District Court to “determine what evidence is privileged and whether any such
evidence is indispensable either to plaintiffs’ prima facie case or to a valid defense 
otherwise available to Jeppesen.  Only if privileged evidence is indispensable to either
party should it dismiss the complaint.”  Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 
992, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009). It is not clear as of this writing whether the administration
may appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
12. Court proceedings are recognized in international law as being indispensable in
protecting against violations of non-derogable rights, such as the right to be free from torture.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated in an Advisory Opinion that "[h]abeas 
corpus performs a vital role in ensuring that a person's life and physical integrity are respected 
. . . in protecting him against torture or other cruel, inhumane, or degrading punishment or
treatment."  Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American 
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
A) (1987), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_08_ing.pdf, in Brief
for Amnesty International et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2007) (Nos. 06-1195,1196). 
13. See infra Part I. 
14. The War Crimes Act criminalizes various breaches of the Geneva Conventions. 18
U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).  The MCA limits criminal prosecution to “grave breaches” and
immunizes at least some conduct that would heretofore have been unlawful. 
Torture is criminalized under 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006).  Sending persons to places
where they might face torture is also prohibited. See Foreign Affairs and Restructuring 
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681–822 (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231 (2006)). The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 immunizes officials if the 
interrogations were “officially authorized and determined to be lawful at the time that
they were conducted” and the official “did not know that the practices were unlawful and
a person of ordinary sense and understanding would not know the practices were
unlawful.” Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1003, 1004, 119 Stat. 
2739. Plainly, both the MCA and the DTA reduce, but do not entirely eliminate the
likelihood of criminal or civil prosecution under the War Crimes Act. 
62
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To understand how and why Boumediene v. Bush15 greatly reduced the
administration’s odds of being able to hide torture, one needs first to
understand the background events leading up to the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006, the reasons for its adoption, and its practical application to 
military commission trials of detainees at Guantanamo Bay.  Only then 
can one understand the significance of extending the constitutional writ 
of habeas corpus to detainees at Guantanamo. 
Legislation rarely finds itself enmeshed in covering up earlier 
wrongdoing. It may be that many in Congress did not so intend.  However,
consequences matter.  One consequence of the MCA—had it succeeded 
without interference from the U.S. court system—would have been to
insulate government officials, high and low, from public knowledge of 
the consequences of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
interrogations of detainees.  Indeed, the current administration’s decision 
to halt the military commissions16 recognizes that Boumediene changes
both political and legal reality.  Once disclosure became inevitable, the 
flaws in the military commissions demonstrated in this article also
became far more visible.  With that visibility came both domestic and
international political embarrassment that would have followed no
matter who had become president. Thus Boumediene radically shifted 
the political reality as well as the legal landscape.  If this is so—and it is
at least arguably so—Boumediene may well prove to be one of the most 
important cases ever.
This case is proving to have profound effects on the detainees as 
courts following Boumediene are slowly17 starting to order the release of 
15. Boumediene v. Bush 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
16. On May 1, 2009, the New York Times reported that the Obama administration 
was moving towards reinstating the military commissions for at least some of the remaining 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay. William Glaberson, U.S. May Revive Guantanamo Military
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/02/us/
politics/02gitmo.html?em.  Administration lawyers are concerned that, because of harsh 
interrogation techniques and the need to use hearsay evidence, they would not be able to
effectively prosecute in federal district courts. Id.
17. Amnesty International vigorously criticizes the slow pace of habeas corpus
relief for Guantanamo detainees, complaining that “10 months after the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled, in Boumediene v. Bush, on 12 June 2008, that the detainees were entitled to
a prompt habeas corpus hearing to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, only a 
handful of them have received a hearing on the merits of their challenges.  Moreover, 
indefinite detention has continued even in cases where judges have ordered the immediate 
release of detainees after such hearings.” USA: Detainees Continue to Bear Costs of
Delay and Lack of Remedy, AMNESTY INT’L REPORT 2009 (Amnesty International), Apr. 9, 
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Guantanamo detainees pursuant to writs of habeas corpus.18  The issue 
for both the government and detainees is not just that conviction rates 
were always likely to be higher in military commissions with fewer fair
trial protections. Even those whom the United States seeks to deport 
rather than try are affected.  This is because, in some cases, the United 
States holds detainees it cannot justifiably keep and cannot easily let go. 
At least one federal district court has tentatively ruled that the 
government cannot deport detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, or 
Bagram air base in Afghanistan to their home countries where they face 
torture.19  Another ordered the release of Chinese Uyghurs, apparently
innocent refugees and no longer thought to be enemy combatants, who 
were swept up in the war against terror.20  The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed and held that notwithstanding their 
eligibility for release on a writ of habeas corpus these people could be 
excluded from the United States under immigration laws.21  Because no 
2009, at 1, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/050/2009/en/dfccba17-8b5a-
430a-9059-af374d5d8c2d/amr510502009eng.pdf. 
18. Federal District Courts in the District of Columbia have issued writs of habeas 
corpus ordering the release of some of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.  It remains to
be seen how these cases may turn out on appeal but it seems likely that at least some
detainees will ultimately secure relief. For example, on January 13, 2009, District Judge 
Richard Leon ordered the release of detainee Mohammed El Gharani, a Chadian citizen
born in Saudi Arabia.  The Government failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that he was an enemy combatant.  Judge Leon wrote: 
Simply stated, a mosaic of tiles bearing images this murky reveals nothing about
the petitioner with sufficient clarity, either individually or collectively, that can
be relied upon by this Court.  Accordingly, the Court must, and will, GRANT the 
detainee’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and order the respondents to take all
necessary and appropriate diplomatic steps to facilitate his release forthwith.
El Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://jurist.
law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/01/federal-judge-grants-guantanamo.php. Judge Leon had
previously ordered the release of five detainees while allowing the government to continue to
hold a sixth.  Jaclyn Belczyk, Federal Judge Orders Five Guantanamo Detainees Released, 
JURIST, Nov. 20, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/11/federal-judge-orders-five-
guantanamo.php. 
 19. Josh White, Judge Orders U.S. Not to Transfer Tunisian Detainee, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 10, 2007, at A11.  See John R. Crook ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law: Developments Regarding the Military Commissions Act, 
101 AM. J. INT’L. L. 636, 659–61 (2007), for other instances where the U.S. has sought to 
send Guantanamo detainees to places where they might be tortured.
20. District Judge Urbina, of the Federal District Court of the District of Columbia, 
ordered the release of seventeen of the Uyghur detainees.  Joe Shaulis, DC Circuit 
Extends Stay of Uighurs Release Pending Expedited Appeal, JURIST, Oct. 21, 2008,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchse/2008/10/dc-circuit-extends-stay-of-uighurs.php. 
Three of these Uyghur detainees are now seeking asylum in Canada with support from
Canadian sponsors. Safiya Boucaud, Guantanamo Uighur Detainees Seek Asylum in Canada, 
JURIST, Feb. 3, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/02/guantanamo-uighur-detainees-
seek-asylum.php.  This order was stayed by the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia with Judge Rogers dissenting.  Id. 
21. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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other country has yet to take them, and because there is apparently a 
realistic fear that they would be tortured if returned to China,22 the 
practical effect of this ruling is to leave their continued and indefinite 
detention to the political branch.  If upheld, this ruling means that for at 
least some people the ancient and constitutional remedy of habeas 
corpus is meaningless.  The political question becomes: will the United 
States continue to hold innocent people, wrongfully swept up in the war 
against terror, in detention simply because no other nation will take 
them?  For the courts, the question becomes: are there constitutionally
wrongful detentions that are nonetheless without remedy?  Even so, the
Uyghurs’ case represents a small part of the problem ultimately
addressed by Boumediene, and it will undoubtedly be resolved in the 
political arena precisely because of what Boumediene represents.
Finally, the Bush administration claimed the right to detain persons it
designated as “enemy combatants” until the end of hostilities.  This 
potential life sentence even applies to those who are completely innocent
of any crime.23  Recourse to a civil habeas court alters that by permitting 
release in appropriate cases.24  Thus, the problem with lack of civilian 
court access before Boumediene applied to most, if not all, detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the broader fallout from this case will 
likely affect all—even the Uyghurs. 
22. Id. at 1024. 
23. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated
and dismissed by Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127
S. Ct. 3078 (2007).  Judge Green wrote at 465–466: 
The government asserts the right to detain an “enemy combatant” until the war
on terrorism has concluded or until the Executive, in its sole discretion, has
determined that the individual no longer poses a threat to national security. 
The government, however, has been unable to inform the Court how long it 
believes the war on terrorism will last. Indeed, the government cannot even 
articulate at this moment how it will determine when the war on terrorism has 
ended. At a minimum, the government has conceded that the war could last 
several generations, thereby making it possible, if not likely, that “enemy
combatants” will be subject to terms of life imprisonment at Guantanamo Bay.
Short of the death penalty, life imprisonment is the ultimate deprivation of
liberty, and the uncertainty of whether the war on terror—and thus the period 
of incarceration—will last a lifetime may be even worse than if the detainees 
had been tried, convicted, and definitively sentenced to a fixed term.  
In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d. at 465–66 (citations omitted). 
24. The inability of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals to release a detainee is
one of the reasons for the court’s decision in Boumediene. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 
F.3d at 1006. 
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A. The Fact of Torture: What We Know and 
What We Can Infer 
The Bush administration consistently attempted to move the law in the 
direction of permitting torture, in part by blurring the lines between
torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.  By doing so, they 
also provided legal cover for those who have engaged in either torture or 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.25  As Christopher Kutz pointed
out, even if the torture lawyers of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) fell
short of persuading the courts to create a judicial space for torture, the
very existence of the torture lawyers’ opinions creates an “advice of 
counsel” defense for senior administration officials.26  They also create a
defense for lower-level operatives, even those who may never have
heard of the OLC opinions and who therefore lack any advice of counsel 
defense.  A person merely following orders is not criminally responsible 
in the absence of a manifestly unlawful command.  Thus, as David
Luban points out, “skilled legal counsel can point to the Office of Legal 
Counsel and Department of Defense memos” as evidence that a CIA
agent’s or a soldier’s conduct could not have been manifestly unlawful.27 
Moreover, recent revelations make it clear that the National Security
Council, with President Bush’s explicit approval,28 micromanaged the
interrogation29 of “high-value” detainees right down to dictating the
details of waterboarding, a practice most Americans,30 as well as most
 25. Jonathan Hafetz argues: 
Since September 11, the Bush Administration has developed an unprecedented 
global detention system, designed to operate outside any established legal framework 
or independent oversight.  By evading existing constraints on custodial interrogations
under domestic and international law, this detention system has undermined the
Unites States’ longstanding commitment to the prohibition against torture and other 
abuse. 
Jonathan Hafetz, Torture, Judicial Review and the Regulation of Custodial Interrogations, 62 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 433 (2007). 
26. Christopher Kutz, The Lawyers Know Sin: Complicity in Torture, in THE TORTURE
DEBATE IN AMERICA 241, 241–46 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006). 
 27. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425,
1427 (2005), reprinted in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 35, 55 (Karen J. Greenberg 
ed., 2006).
28. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Howard L. Rosenberg & Ariane de Vogue, Bush Aware 
of Advisors’ Interrogation Talks, ABCNEWS, Apr. 11, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/
LawPolitics/story?id=4635175&page=1b. 
29. Press Release, Highest-Level Bush Administration Officials Approved, Discussed
U.S. Post-9/11 Torture Program, CTR. CONST. RTS., Apr. 10, 2008, http://ccrjustice.
org/newsroom/press-releases/highest-level-bush-administration-officials-approved-discussed-
-post-911-torture-program. 
30. See, e.g., Poll Results: Waterboarding is Torture, CNN.com, Nov. 6, 2007, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/06/waterboard.poll/. 
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other people throughout the world,31 consider a form of torture.  As I 
point out in Creating a Torture Culture, a person following even
unlawful orders is protected from prosecution if those orders were not 
“manifestly unlawful.”  This makes prosecution and conviction difficult 
for the added reason that it would be very hard to prove that the orders 
of the President together with the support of the entire National Security
Council, including the Attorney General, were “manifestly unlawful.”32 
However, difficult does not mean impossible.  Jordan Paust argues
that the OLC’s legal advice was “manifestly erroneous”33 and that 
administration officials up to former President Bush should be prosecuted.34 
Others argue that the recently released secret OLC memoranda demolishes 
the “good faith” excuse.35 Moreover, the leak of a confidential report by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross demonstrates that not only
was the treatment of detainees far worse than previously reported, but 
that the Red Cross calls for prosecution of those responsible.36 This 
31. One poll shows that 59% of people around the world reject torture to elicit 
information even if it would save innocent lives.  Opposition to torture is strongest in 
Europe generally—81% of Italians are opposed to the practice, as are 72% of British and
58% of American.  The poll had an N=27,407 with margins of error varying by country from
2.5 to 4 percent. World Citizens Reject Torture, Global Poll Suggests, BBC NEWS, July 26,
2007, http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2006/10_october/19/poll.shtml.
74% of Canadians agreed that “[c]lear rules against torture should be maintained,” while 
only 22% thought “[g]overnments should now be allowed to use some degree of torture.”
Torture is Rejected, Even in Struggle against Terrorism, BBC NEWS, http://www.globescan. 
com/news_archives/bbctorture06/detail.html (providing detailed country by country results
from this worldwide poll) (last visited Sept. 20, 2009). 
32. Alan Clarke, Creating a Torture Culture, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 
46–50 (2008).
33. Jordan J. Paust, Op-Ed., The Second Bybee Memo: A Smoking Gun, JURIST, Apr. 
22, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/04/second-bybee-memo-smoking-gun.php 
(arguing that the second Bybee memo provides evidence of “serial criminality” and that 
the advice was “manifestly erroneous” as to waterboarding and placing people in small 
boxes).
34. Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and
Appropriate Sanctions, 43 Val. U. L. Rev. 1535, 1565–67 (2009) (setting out the bases 
for prosecuting torture and other harsh interrogations and arguing that members of the
Bush administration—from lawyers in the Department of Justice to members of the 
National Security Council’s principals committee—were criminally involved in 
committing torture and that President Bush approved).
35. Posting of Brian Tamanaha, The Collapse of the “Good Faith” Excuse for Yoo 
(Bybee, Delahunty), to BALKINIZATION, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/03/collapse-of-
good-faith-excuse-for-yoo.html (Mar. 5, 2009). 
36. Red Cross, supra note 3, at 27 (recommending “that the U.S. authorities
investigate all allegations of ill-treatment and take steps to punish the perpetrators, where
appropriate, and to prevent such abuses from happening again”). 
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report details highly credible allegations of torture as to fourteen “high 
value” detainees. A criminal complaint was filed against former Bush 
administration lawyers in Spain’s Audiencia Nacional asserting universal
jurisdiction for crimes against humanity.37  Prosecutors there recommended
against going forward with a prosecution, and the case has now been
referred to an investigating magistrate.38  Law professor Scott Horton 
argues that the ICRC report calling U.S. interrogations torture “makes it
far more likely that the Spanish prosecution will go forward.”39 
Moreover, other pressures for prosecution continue to mount,40 and 
prosecution under the universal jurisdiction doctrine remains possible.41 
Nonetheless, the U.S. is unlikely to extradite anyone to Spain, and the 
Obama administration will likely continue to resist any such prosecution, 
as it will be hesitant to see such a precedent affecting not only high-level 
members of the preceding administration but potentially the former
president as well.42
 37. Andrew Gilmore, Spain Judge Weighing Probe of U.S. Lawyers Who 
Promoted Guantanamo: Reports, JURIST, Mar. 28, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/ 
2009/03/ spain-judge-weighing-probe-of-us.php. 
 38. Tere Miller-Sporrer, Spain Court Assigns New Judge to Probe U.S. Officials Who
Backed Guantanamo, JURIST, Apr. 24, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/04/ 
spain-court-assigns-new-judge-to-probe.php. 
39. Scott Horton, Investigate and Punish the Perpetrators, HARPERS, Apr. 6, 2009,
http://harpers.org/archive/2009/04/hbc-90004701. 
40. The U.N. special rapporteur on torture, Manfred Nowak, said on April 24, 
2009, that the Department of Justice is obligated under the Convention Against Torture to
prosecute lawyers who drafted the recently released memos outlining controversial 
interrogation techniques for the CIA and providing the legal rationale.  Steve Czajkowski, 
U.S. Must Prosecute CIA Interrogation Memo Authors: U.N. Torture Investigator, 
JURIST, Apr. 25, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/04/us-must-prosecute-cia-
interrogation.php.  See also Lucas Tanglen,U.S. Must Investigate Bush-Era CIA Interrogators:
U.N. Torture Expert, JURIST, Apr. 19, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ paperchase/2009/04/us-
must-investigate-bush-era-cia.php; Veronika Oleksyn, U.N. Torture Envoy: U.S. Must
Prosecute Bush Lawyers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 24, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/
International/wireStory?id=7420160. 
41. Jason Webb, Spain Could Open Second Guantanamo Torture Probe, REUTERS, 
May 5, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL534094 (reporting that Spanish
Judge Eloy Velasco has asked U.S. authorities to confirm whether an investigation has 
begun into allegations of officially approved torture.  This is a formality as it is known that no
U.S. prosecution exists, but it would be a necessary step as the Spanish Court cannot act 
if domestic U.S. courts proceed.  Another judge, Baltazar Garzon has launched a separate probe
into the allegations swirling around the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay).
42. As columnist Thomas L. Friedman has argued: 
The president’s decision to expose but not prosecute those responsible for this
policy is surely unsatisfying; some of this abuse involved sheer brutality that 
had nothing to do with clear and present dangers.  Then why justify the Obama 
compromise?  Two reasons: the first is that because justice taken to its logical 
end here would likely require bringing George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld,
and other senior officials to trial, which would rip our country apart; and the 
other is that Al Qaeda truly was a unique enemy, and the post-9/11 era a 
deeply confounding war. . . . 
68
CLARKE FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2009 9:27 AM     
 





























     
 
[VOL. 11:  59, 2009] De-cloaking Torture 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
Moreover, these formerly higher-level officials who generated the 
orders will undoubtedly argue that they relied in good faith on 
competent legal counsel.43  The lawyers involved argue that they gave
good faith advice in conditions of radical uncertainty.44  And the
followers of such advice will argue good faith compliance with orders 
vetted by competent counsel that were not manifestly unlawful.  The 
issue that any court, domestic or foreign, must confront will be whether 
such orders were so manifestly unlawful as to render the giving or taking 
of such advice illusory.  Plainly it will be difficult for any court, 
domestic or foreign, to conclude that orders running from the former 
President, after relying on legal advice from the Department of Justice,
were either in bad faith or manifestly unlawful.  This is a political fact
rather than a strictly legal conclusion; prosecutions leading to the former
U.S. president remain problematic.45 
Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., A Torturous Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009 at 
A23. 
43. Advice of counsel can provide a defense to the mental state required for some 
crimes.  The issue here would be whether the advice of counsel, scrupulously followed,
would render the interrogator’s conduct “not manifestly unlawful.” The general rule has 
been stated:
(1) before taking action, (2) he in good faith sought the advice of an attorney
whom he considered competent, (3) for the purpose of securing advice on the 
lawfulness of his possible future conduct, (4) and made a full and accurate 
report to his attorney of all material facts which the defendant knew, (5) and 
acted strictly in accordance with the advice of his attorney who had been given 
a full report. 
United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 823 (7th Cir. 2008).  While not a certainty, 
one can argue that the general rule applies here.  This fact likely provides a strong reason 
beyond politics for the Obama administration’s position that C.I.A. interrogators should
not be prosecuted so long as they followed the legal advice of the Department of Justice. 
Editorial, Taking on Torture: An Investigation Into Abuse of Suspected Terrorists is 
Vital, But It Must be Conducted with Care, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2009, at A20. 
44. Former head of the Office of Legal Counsel, Jay Bybee, who signed off on
some of the most controversial of the “torture memos” has said:
The central question for lawyers was a narrow one; locate, under the statutory
definition, the thin line between harsh treatment of a high-ranking Al Qaeda 
terrorist that is not torture and harsh treatment that is.  I believed at the time,
and continue to believe today, that the conclusions were legally correct. . . . 
The legal question was and is difficult . . . .  And the stakes for the country were
significant no matter what our opinion.  In that context, we gave our best, honest 
advice, based on our good-faith analysis of the law. 
Neil A. Lewis, Official Defends Signing Interrogation Memos, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2009, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/us/politics/29bybee.html?scp=1
&sq=bybee%20good%20faith&st=Search (emphasis added). 
45. Bar complaints against former administration lawyers may be another matter. 
Carrie Johnson reports in the Washington Post that unnamed sources within the Department
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Finally, one may reasonably ask: how could low-level agents second-
guess the lawfulness of practices approved by some of the administration’s 
senior lawyers and indeed by the administration itself?  How could such 
a practice be “manifestly unlawful” to them and not their superiors?
These memoranda, and the administration’s admission that it approved 
of the practices used, by their simple existence, create uncertainty, which
in turn facilitates the argument that the interrogations could not have 
been “manifestly unlawful.” 
The Bush administration was forced, by the practical need to protect 
its agents from prosecution,46 to admit some fraction of its practices; that 
does not, however, mean that the former administration would want all 
the details to be made public or to have anyone, civilian courts included, 
learn of the scope and intensity of what it euphemistically calls its 
“alternative interrogation techniques.” 
As Jonathan Hafetz points out: 
[A]s a series of government memoranda and reports suggest, post-September 11
detentions have been motivated in large part by the desire to avoid established
restrictions on custodial interrogations and, in turn, to keep the methods of those 
interrogations secret. The resulting abuses are now legion, including the torture 
and other mistreatment at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, at Abu Ghraib in
Iraq, and at the network of CIA-run “black sites” or secret prisons, where some of
the most coercive interrogations have been carried out.47 
Moreover, notwithstanding the mounting pressures,48 the new 
administration may also not be enthusiastic about full disclosure. 
Indeed, in light of the continued assertion of the state secrets privilege
of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility say that an early draft of its investigation
recommended referrals for disciplinary action against at least two former Office of Legal
Counsel lawyers: Jay S. Bybee and John C. Yoo.  Carrie Johnson, Democrats Seek More 
Interrogation Documents, WASH. POST, May 5, 2009, at A3, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/04/AR2009050403510.html?hpid=more
headlines. 
46. See infra Part X.A (noting that war crimes prosecutions remain unlikely
notwithstanding Boumediene; and pointing out that recent disclosures of the 
details of the methods by which “high value” detainees were interrogated, 
including the use of waterboarding, and the fact that these methods emanated from the
National Security Council and ultimately from President Bush himself work to lessen the 
prospect of such prosecutions by making it harder to demonstrate that any such order
was “manifestly unlawful”).
47. Hafetz, supra note 25, at 434. 
48. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 45 (reporting that “House Judiciary Committee 
Chairman John Conyers (D-Mich.) and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard 
L. Berman (D-Calif.) asked officials at the State Dept. and National Archives to produce 
a May 2005 memo[,]” by Philip D. Zelikow who wrote in a blog, “that he dissented from 
conclusions by the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel four years ago that the
[interrogation] methods were legal.  Additionally, he wrote that . . . White House officials . . .
‘attempted to collect and destroy all copies of my memo’”). 
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by the Obama administration in civil cases alleging torture,49 it appears 
that the present administration is reluctant to open new avenues that
would make full disclosure more likely.
Furthermore, the present administration has continued the Bush 
administration policy of maintaining that the writ of habeas corpus 
extends no further than Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  The administration has
told a federal judge that detainees in Afghanistan cannot seek release in
the U.S. civilian court system.50  The District Judge rejected the 
administration’s position,51 but the administration has sought certification 
for an interlocutory appeal.52  On issue after issue, disclosure has come 
involuntarily and grudgingly.  Government admits what it must53 and 
continues to obscure what it can.  The importance of this point cannot be
overstated.  For all of its supposed openness, the Obama administration 
has no interest in full disclosure. Such would invite Republican
resistance54 and would open the United States to even greater international
pressure.  This underlines Boumediene’s importance in uncovering and 
exposing torture. 
49. See sources cited supra note 11. 
50. Charlie Savage, Embracing Bush Argument, Obama Upholds Detainee Policy in 
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009 at A6. 
51. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-1669, 604 F. Supp. 205 (D.D.C. July 18, 2007).  
See infra, notes 278–279 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of this case and
the issues that it will raise on appeal).
52. Andrew Gilmore, Obama Administration to Appeal Bagram Detainees Habeas 
Ruling, JURIST, Apr. 11, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/04/obama-
administration-to-appeal-bagram.php. 
53. Even the recent release of secret memos authorizing waterboarding and other 
harsh interrogation techniques was likely not voluntary.  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is
reported to have supported the disclosure notwithstanding his assessment that it might 
put U.S. forces at risk because disclosure was inevitable.  Thom Shanker, Gates Voices
Concerns About Release of Interrogation Memos, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009 at A14;
Administration, Senate Leaders Weigh in Against Independent Probe of Bush Officials, 
BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, Apr. 24, 2009. 
54. Professor Benjamin Davis of the University of Toledo College of Law writes
that members of the Senate threatened “the nominations of Dawn Johnsen to head the 
Office of Legal Counsel and [Dean]Harold Hongju Koh to be Department of State Legal 
Adviser,” because of the threatened release of still classified documents from the Bush 
administration relating to harsh interrogations.  Benjamin Davis, America’s Moment of 
Truth on Torture, JURIST, Apr. 10, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/04/americas- 
moment-of-truth-on-torture.php.  Some senators are apparently threatening to “go nuclear.” 
Id.  Similarly, Professor Marjorie Cohn of Thomas Jefferson School of Law argues, “Obama
fears that holding Team Bush to account will risk alienating Republicans whom he still 
seeks to win over.” War Criminals, Including Their Lawyers, Must Be Prosecuted, http://www.
marjoriecohn.com/2009/02/war-criminals-including-their-lawyers. html (Feb. 19, 2009, 17:29). 
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This Article then accepts the proposition that, despite denials that the 
U.S. has tortured,55 that it, at least until the end of the Bush 
administration,56 continued to use abusive interrogation practices, and 
continued to protect itself by sending people offshore57 for unfair trials, 
thereby enabling them to hide abusive practices.  Right up until its last
days, the Bush administration continued to pursue policies that insulated
officials from allegations of torture and other cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading interrogation practices.58  It also accepts that the Obama
administration has shown tepid interest in uncovering or disclosing its 
predecessor’s conduct.59 
55. A FBI report on Guantanamo interrogations observed: 
On a couple of occassions [sic], I entered interview rooms to find a detainee
chained hand and foot in a fetal position to the floor, with no chair, food, or
water.  Most times they had urinated or defacated [sic] on themselves [sic], and
had been left there for 18–24 hours or more.  On one occassion, the air
conditioning had been turned down so far and the temperature was so cold in
the room, that the barefooted detainee was shaking with cold.  When I asked the 
MP’s what was going on, I was told that interrogators from the day prior had
ordered this treatment, and the detainee was not to be moved.  On another occassion 
[sic], the A/C had been turned off, making the temperature in the unventilated
room probably well over 100 degrees.  The detainee was almost unconcious [sic]
on the floor, with a pile of hair next to him.  He had apparently been literally
pulling his own hair out throughout the night.  On another occassion [sic], not 
only was the temperature unbearably hot, but extremely loud rap music was 
being played in the room, and had been since the day before, with the detainee
chained hand and foot in the fetal position on the tile floor.
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 474 (2005), vacated and dismissed
sub nom, Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 
3078 (2007), decided 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
56. It appears that the CIA has, since the inauguration, adopted new interrogation
procedures that discontinue so-called enhanced interrogation techniques.  The agency has also
closed secret prisons or black sites around the world. At the same time the CIA has 
acknowledged the destruction of ninety-two videotapes of interrogations of detained
suspected terrorists.  Brian Jackson, CIA Outlines New Detention and Interrogation Policies,
JURIST, Apr. 10, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/04/cia-outlines-new-detention-
and.php.
57. The practice of sending and holding people at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was
controversial enough to spark debate within the Bush administration.  Then Secretary of
State Condollezza Rice, former Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates all argued in favor of closing it down and sending detainees elsewhere.
Vice President Dick Cheney and the Department of Justice sought to keep Guantanamo
Bay open.  Crook, supra note 19, at 660–61. 
58. As Richard Bilder and Detlev Vagts point out: “even if [the OLC legal] memoranda
somehow have the effect of protecting persons involved in torture or war crimes from 
prosecution under U.S. law, they may not provide protection from prosecution or liability in
international tribunals or the courts of other countries.”  Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F.
Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM J. INT’L L. 689, 694 (2004), 
reprinted in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 151, 154 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006). 
59. The ACLU responded to the continued assertion of the state secrets privilege
in the Jeppesen case:
We are shocked and deeply disappointed that the Justice Department has chosen to
continue the Bush administration’s practice of dodging judicial scrutiny of 
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Finally, intent is in play. Some political actors, not all, do have things 
to hide60 and the consequence of the MCA would have been to insulate
those practices from scrutiny.  While many in Congress may have 
intended well, the consequences of this legislation were not benign. 
According to its defenders, the purpose of the MCA (as with all earlier 
actions) was and is to protect national security and specifically to protect 
sensitive information.  This Article argues that, whatever its intent, its 
actual consequences are very different.  Indeed, if protection of sensitive 
information was all that was necessary, the MCA would look very 
different and its ability to hide torture would be less extreme.  As we 
will see, the MCA tilted the balance far beyond what would be necessary
for protecting national secrets; it hides torture.  Boumediene readdresses
that imbalance and opens the way for disclosure. 
Context is critical to this analysis.  When one views the rules formally 
and in isolation, the protection of national security and important state
secrets may seem the plausible goal.  This is, however, superficial and
pretextual. When we look at the consequences of one Administration 
move after another, we can see the MCA endgame for what it is: the 
final move in a series to protect and screen from scrutiny a U.S. “torture
culture.” 
To see why this is so will require detailed review of the U.S. response 
to the attacks of September 11, 2001.  This paper maintains that the 
MCA prevented disclosure of abusive interrogation practices61 that many 
extraordinary rendition and torture. This was an opportunity for the 
new administration to act on its condemnation of torture and rendition, but 
instead it has chosen to stay the course.  Now we must hope that the court will
assert its independence by rejecting the government’s false claims of state
secrets and allowing the victims of torture and rendition their day in court. 
Press Release, ACLU, Justice Department Stands behind Bush Secrecy in Extraordinary
Rendition Case (Feb. 9, 2009), http://aclu.org/safefree/torture/38695prs20090209.html.  
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the administration’s state secrets claim and it is
not known at this time whether the administration will appeal.  See sources cited supra
note 11. 
60. See sources cited supra note 11. 
61. See, e.g., CIA Admits Waterboarding Inmates, BBC NEWS, Feb. 5, 2008, http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7229169.stm; see also, Jamie Mayerfeld, Playing by Our
Own Rules: How U.S. Marginalization of International Human Rights Law Led 
to Torture, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 89, 90 n.5 (2007).  CIA officials, speaking off the record, 
have identified these as officially authorized methods. See, Brian Ross & Richard Esposito,
CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described, ABC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2005, http://abc
news.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1322866; Dana Priest, Covert CIA 
Program Withstands New Furor: Anti-Terror Effort Continues to Grow, WASH. POST, Dec. 
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people consider torture.62  It infers that much more is unknown about
these abusive practices.63  It assumes that, if we did know, we would be
shocked. It infers that the former Bush administration would not want 
the world to discover all, and that the present administration will have to
be pushed if full disclosure is to occur.
B. Structure of the Argument 
Part II begins with a few more reasons why Boumediene is so
important.  By removing the MCA’s habeas stripping provisions it exposes
these cases to review, putting the torture issue at the end of a series of 
moves into the endgame. 
Part III addresses the early Administration’s response to the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 with a particular focus on the effect of the Joint 
Resolution by Congress for the Authorization for the Use of Military 
Force and the broad assumptions made by those who responded during 
this period. This response prepared the way for the Administration to 
establish a “torture culture.” Part IV delves into the first military
commissions, why they were so problematic, and why they eventually
ran into trouble. Part V provides the legal reasoning behind the 
Administration’s many moves toward a “torture culture” and Part VI
30, 2005, at A1; Dana Priest, Inside the CIA Officials Relieved Secret Is Shared, WASH.
POST, Sept. 7, 2006, at A17. 
62. Poll Results: Waterboarding is Torture, supra note 30. 
63. The fact that then Attorney General nominee (Attorney General in the Bush 
administration following Alberto Gonzales) Michael Mukasey refused to call waterboarding 
“torture” has led to speculation that he did not want to get into the position of calling a 
technique that our forces have in fact used to be torture, because that would then put him 
in the position of having to decide whether or not to prosecute under the War Crimes
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441, or under the Anti-torture act, 18 U.S.C. § 2340.  The United 
States prosecuted waterboarding as a war crime when carried out by others during World
War II. See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Senate Committee Approves Mukasey Nomination, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, at A22.  It is widely thought that the U.S. has waterboarded people 
and that the highest levels of the administration approved the technique.  The U.S. did 
not invent the technique, which was called “tortura del aqua,” or water torture, during the
Spanish Inquisition.  Administration officials deny that its practices are similar, claiming that
the present practice is subject to strict safeguards and does not involve water coming into
the lungs. Dan Eggen, Justice Official Defends Rough CIA Interrogations, WASH. POST, Feb. 
17, 2008, at A3. 
The French used waterboarding in fighting the Algerian insurgency in the 1950s.
French journalist Henri Alleg who was reporting on the war in Algeria describes waterboarding: 
I was put on a plank, on a board, fastened to it and taken to a tap [water faucet].
And my face was covered with a rag.  Very quickly, the rag was completely
full of water.  You have the impression of being drowned.  And the water ran
all over my face.  I couldn’t breathe.  It’s a terrible, terrible impression of torture
and of death, being near death.
Amy Goodman, A Vote for Mukasey is a Vote for Torture, DEMOCRACY NOW, 
http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20071106_a_vote_for_mukasey_is_a_vote_for_torture/. 
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follows with the initial judicial response limiting the effect of much of
what the Administration had sought to accomplish to that point.  The
Administration’s response to the Courts exposes the “torture culture” for
what it is.  Part VII introduces the Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which attempted to undo the 
Supreme Court’s work.  It is at this point that we can clearly see the
scramble to hide torture.
In Part VIII, we see the Supreme Court again setting rules that, if 
allowed to play out, would have exposed the torture regime as it then 
existed. This then is the context leading up to Part IX, How the Military 
Commissions Act Cloaked Torture, and is the reason for proceeding
through so much recent history. It is at this point that we can see this 
legislation as the last major move of a waning Administration focused
on finally cloaking torture.  It is in this section that we review how the 
rules will likely work once military commissions actually begin to try
detainees, and how these rules facilitate torture, and insulate coercive
interrogation practices.  Finally, in Part X, we show how Boumediene
alters the situation such that no administration can any longer effectively 
hide torture.  Whatever President Obama’s political leanings, Boumediene
opened up the process and made uncovering the prior administration’s
use of harsh interrogation techniques inevitable.  Whether Boumediene
simply provided political cover for what the Obama administration 
already wanted to do, or forced its hand, is irrelevant.  Either way,
Boumediene pushes strongly in the direction of more openness.
II. THE ISSUE’S IMMEDIATE IMPORTANCE
At first, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
Boumediene v. Bush.64  It later changed course after two votes (Justices 
Kennedy and Stevens) switched.65 The wording of the order itself 
demonstrated the importance of the case in that it mentioned two 
pending lower appeals court decisions and forewarned that additional
briefing would be required.66 Ordinarily, the U.S. Supreme Court prefers 
64. Boumediene v. Bush, 549 U.S. 1328 (2007) (cert. denied). 
65. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (cert. granted).
66. The order read: 
Petitions for rehearing granted.  Orders entered April 2, 2007, denying the petition 
for writ of certiorari vacated.  Petition for writ of certiorari granted.  The case
is consolidated and a total of one hour is allotted for oral argument.  As it 
would be of material assistance to consult any decision in Bismullah v. Gates, 
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to allow an important issue to percolate through the lower courts so that 
they will have the benefit of lower court reasoning as well as a fully 
developed and argued record.  Moreover, the Court rarely takes on a 
case before it is fully exhausted, as sometimes events transpire in the 
courts below that moot the necessity for Supreme Court review.  That
notwithstanding, at least five justices were apparently concerned enough 
about the unfairness of the still unfolding process that they were willing 
to take the case even before exhaustion of available remedies.67  The  
Court not only cut off having the military’s process run its course, it also
cut off percolation of the issues through the lower courts.  Reversals of a 
denial of certiorari are unquestionably rare,68 and they are rarer still
where the Court has legitimate reasons, based on sound institutional
practice, to wait. 
An affidavit filed with the Supreme Court by Lt. Col. Stephen
Abraham,69 detailing just how much of a sham70 the Combatant Status
No. 06-1197, and Parhat v. Gates, No. 06-1397, currently pending in the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, supplemental 
briefing will be scheduled upon the issuance of any decision in those cases. 
Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007). In Bismullah v. Gates, the Court of 
Appeals ultimately gave “guidance as to what evidence can be made part of the record on 
review and what access the detainees can have to counsel and to classified information.” 
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263.  Boumediene went on to say, “Under the circumstances 
we believe the costs of further delay substantially outweigh any benefits of remanding to 
the Court of Appeals to consider the issue it did not address in these cases.”  Id. at 87.
67. The Statement of Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy respecting the denial of
certiorari, said in part: 
Despite the obvious importance of the issues raised in these cases, we are persuaded 
that traditional rules governing our decision of constitutional questions, and
our practice of requiring the exhaustion of available remedies as a precondition 
to accepting jurisdiction over applications for the writ of habeas corpus, make 
it appropriate to deny these petitions at this time.  However, “[t]his Court has
frequently recognized that the policy underlying the exhaustion-of-remedies
doctrine does not require the exhaustion of inadequate remedies.”  If petitioners
later seek to establish that the Government has unreasonably delayed proceedings 
under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739, or some 
other and ongoing injury, alternative means exist for us to consider our jurisdiction
over the allegations made by petitioners before the Court of Appeals.  Were the
Government to take additional steps to prejudice the position of petitioners in
seeking review in this Court, “courts of competent jurisdiction,” including this
Court, “should act promptly to ensure that the office and purposes of the writ
of habeas corpus are not compromised. 
Boumediene v. Bush, 549 U.S. 1328 (2007) (citations omitted). 
68. On April 26, 2007, Justice Roberts denied an application for an extension of 
time for a petition to rehear the order denying certiorari saying that “This most extraordinary
relief will not be granted unless there is a ‘reasonable likelihood of this Court’s reversing
its previous position and granting certiorari.’”  Plainly, Chief Justice Roberts did not think 
reversal likely.  Boumediene v. Bush, 550 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2007) (quoting Richmond v. 
Arizona, 434 U.S. 1323 (1977)).
69. Abraham “described a haphazard, inconsistent system of presenting at-times
classified intelligence to military officers assigned specifically to serve at Gauantanamo,”
76
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Review Tribunals71 (CSRTs) were in practice, may have influenced this
remarkable turnaround. (CSRTs came relatively late in the process in
response to adverse Supreme Court decisions,72 and are discussed more
fully below). 
Boumediene drew some forty-nine briefs, including amici briefs73 
from: the American Bar Association; Canadian Parliamentarians and 
Canadian Professors of Law; Arlen Spector, Ranking Member, Senate
Judiciary Committee; The National Institute of Military Justice; U.S.
Diplomats; a variety of NGOs; U.S. law professors with expertise in
Federal Courts and International Law; Louise Arbour, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights; Professors of Legal History (including 
Sir. John H.  Baker, Downing Professor of the Laws of England, St. 
and he wrote that “What were purported to be specific statements of fact lacked even the
most fundamental earmarks of objectively credible evidence.”  Carl Rosenberg, Bush’s 
Anti-Terror Powers to Get High Court Review, MIAMI HERALD, June 30, 2007, at A3. 
70. There are a number of reported incidences where the CSRP returned a finding
that the detainee was “not/no longer” an enemy combatant.  The Department of Defense 
convened new panels (in one case there were three), which eventually returned a finding
that the detainee was an enemy combatant subject to a military commission.  “The 
Department of Justice has denied these allegations in court filings.”  Crook, supra note 
19, at 660. See also, Tom J. Farer, The Two Faces of Terror, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 363,
377 (2007). See infra Part VII (discussing Combatant Status Review Tribunals). 
71. A detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, must first be found to be an “alien
illegal enemy combatant” before he may be tried before a military commission pursuant 
to the Military Commissions Act of 2006.  Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948(a) 
(2006).  It is the role of the Combatant Status Review Panel to make this determination.
Indeed, the case of Canadian citizen, Omar Khadr, revolved around the issue of whether
the military commission had jurisdiction given that the CSRP only found him to be an
“enemy combatant” not an “illegal enemy combatant.”  The military trial judge presiding 
over Khadr’s military commission ruled he lacked jurisdiction due to this classification;
The Court of Military Commission Review set up to review tribunal decisions under the
MCA of 2006 reversed this decision and held that the military judge had the authority to
make this determination.  Khadr’s lawyers attempted to appeal this decision to the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, but the Court dismissed the case for lack of 
jurisdiction. Once remanded, Khadr’s case came before Colonel Peter Brownback, U.S. 
Army Judge, on November 8, 2007 where he determined that Khadr was in fact an 
illegal enemy combatant.  Khadr’s trial before a military commission was originally set
for May 2008, but that date has been cancelled. Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112, 
1114 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The first detainee to actually reach a trial before a military
commission was former bin Laden driver Salim Hamdan who was convicted and received a 5
1/2-year sentence.  William Glaberson , Detainee Convicted on Terrorism Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2008, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/04/washington/
04gitmo.html.
72. See infra Part VI. 
73. See Scotuswiki, http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php?title=Boumediene/Al-
Odah_v._Bush, for the amicus briefs. 
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Catherine’s College, University of Cambridge); and a brief by 383 U.K. 
and European Parliamentarians.  The writer cannot remember any recent
case generating this amount of interest.  It confronts the historical reach
of the Great Writ, and its answer goes directly to the heart of what it 
means to be a constitutional democracy with a rule of law that provides 
access to neutral and impartial justice. Boumediene may well come to
be seen as one of the Court’s greatest decisions in favor of liberty.  But it 
might have been otherwise; it could have become its greatest failure of 
nerve since it validated the internment of the Japanese during World 
War II.74 
III. THE PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS: ASSUMPTIONS ON
THE ROAD TO TORTURE
Within a week of September 11, 2001, Congress passed by joint
resolution the Authorization to Use Military Force, giving the President 
broad powers to prosecute a new kind of war, not solely against a nation, 
but also against amorphously defined terrorists and all who helped them, 
wherever they might be. 
Presidential powers included the use of “all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . .75  It  
also provided “specific statutory authorization” under the war powers
resolution.76  The circumstances were extreme.77  It is, however, difficult 
to imagine a broader mandate; Congress, overwhelmingly supported by
frightened Democrats,78 gave blanket permission.  Thus, regardless of 
74. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the exclusion order 
leading to the internment of people of Japanese descent during World War II, this case is
widely considered to be one of the Supreme Court’s worst decisions). 
75. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat, 225 
(codified in note following 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000, Supp. III)).  
76. Id. § 2(b)(1). 
77. President Bush said of these events: 
Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in
a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims were in airplanes,
or in their offices; secretaries, businessmen and women, military and federal
workers; moms and dads, friends and neighbors.  Thousands of lives were suddenly
ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.  The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, 
fires burning, huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible 
sadness, and a quiet, unyielding anger. These acts of mass murder were intended to
frighten our nation into chaos and retreat.  But they have failed; our country is 
strong.
Statement by President Bush in his address to the nation on Sept. 11, 2001, http://www. 
september11news.com/PresidentBush.htm. 
78. The House vote was 420 to 1. Philip Shenon, After the Attacks: The Lone
Voice–In One Vote, a Call for Restraint, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at 6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/16/us/after-the-attacks-the-lone-voice-in-one-vote-a-
78
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whether the “war on terror” is a true war under the laws of war,79 
President Bush became a wartime president.80 
The Bush administration began with the assumption that the enemy (at 
a minimum, the Taliban and al-Qaeda81) consisted of non-state terrorists,
themselves bound by no law and therefore outside the protection of the 
law.82  They also assumed that harsh interrogation methods generally 
call-for-restraint.html.  The lone dissenting vote came from Barbara Lee of California, 
who is a committed pacifist and whose district includes Oakland and Berkeley. Id. 
79. Scholars have argued that the “war on terror” does not meet the criteria for war
because it is not against a state, nation, belligerent, or even an insurgent group as those
groups are understood in international law.  See, Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction 
and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons,
Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1340–41 (2004).  This distinction is important because under 
the laws of war certain conduct that would otherwise be unlawful becomes legitimate, 
and it confers unwarranted status on al-Qaeda. Id. at 1342–43. 
80. “[W]e assume that the AUMF activated the President’s war powers . . . and that
those powers include the authority to convene military commissions in appropriate 
circumstances.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594 (2006). 
81. On January 2, 2002 OLC lawyers John Yoo and Robert Delahunty wrote to
William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense, arguing that the Geneva
Conventions did not apply to either the Taliban or al Qaeda.  Al Qaeda was deemed not a 
signatory to the Conventions while the Taliban at best represented a failed state as to 
which the Geneva Conventions also need not apply.  On January 11, Robert Taft of the 
State Department objected to this novel failed state theory but on January 18, President 
Bush initially decided that the Geneva Conventions had no applicability to either the 
Taliban or al-Qaeda.  Secretary of State Colin Powell objected, and then on January 22, 
2003, Jay Bybee issued an additional memorandum to Haynes and to Alberto Gonzales, 
then Counsel to the President, echoing arguments against having the Geneva
Conventions apply to either the Taliban or al Qaeda. On January 25, Alberto Gonzales 
ruled that the initial Yoo memorandum is definitive and recommended that Bush adhere
to his initial position.  Powell again on January 26 wrote a memo to the White House 
arguing that the Geneva Conventions do apply but, on February 1, 2002 Attorney
General John Ashcroft opined that the Geneva Conventions do not apply and that the 
failed state theory supports that conclusion.  Ultimately, on February 7, 2002 President
Bush decided not to follow the failed state theory.  He ruled that the Geneva Conventions, 
however, would not apply.  As to al Qaeda he accepted the argument that it was not as
state and was not a signatory to the Geneva Conventions.  As to the Taliban, while 
Afghanistan was a state signatory to the Geneva Conventions, because they did not wear 
distinctive uniforms they could not be considered to be prisoners of war.  Nor, did
Common Article 3 apply because it was interpreted narrowly to only apply to civil wars 
and other internal struggles not crossing international borders. See THE TORTURE DEBATE
IN AMERICA (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006); MICHAEL RATNER, THE TRIAL OF DONALD
RUMSFELD, Chapter 4 (2008). 
82. “Partly driving the process was a righteous indignation that the virtuous United 
States had been attacked by immoral terrorists fighting a total war involving attacks on 
innocent civilians.”  David P. Forsythe, United States Policy toward Enemy Detainees in 
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work better than softer methods, and that quick and successful 
interrogations would save lives.83 
Their method turned on using quirky, ahistorical, and formalistic 
interpretations of statutory or treaty language that allowed them to find
gaps where arguably no law applied.  From those gaps they inferred
permission.84  They failed to recognize, or ignored, the fact that their
legal reasoning closely mirrored that of Nazi lawyers over sixty years 
ago.85 Indeed, the Nazis thought that International Humanitarian Law 
was “the relic of a chivalrous notion” while U.S. Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales thought the Geneva Conventions “quaint” and
“obsolete.”86  Nor did the Administration credit the French experience in 
the “War on Terrorism”, 48 HUM. RTS. Q. 465, 471 (2006) (citing James Mann, RISE OF
THE VULCANS: THE HISTORY OF BUSH’S WAR CABINET 297 (2004)).
83. One of the strongest defenses of torture by the Bush Administration comes 
from columnist Charles Krauthammer, who has written, “[t]he monstrous thing about 
torture is that sometimes it does work.”  Krauthammer goes on to describe the torture of
a Palestinian who provided accurate information about an Israeli corporal who had been 
kidnapped.  Charles Krauthammer, The Truth about Torture, WEEKLY STANDARD, Dec. 5,
2005, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/400rhqav.asp.
See Heather MacDonald, How to Interrogate Terrorists, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN 
AMERICA 84 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006), for another defense of the administration’s
techniques while claiming that they do not amount torture. 
84. Many scholars have pointed out the process by which administration lawyers 
purported to find gaps in the law and then from those supposed holes found implied 
permission for aggressive interrogation techniques.  See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered
Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1333 (2007), for perhaps the clearest exposition of this.  Satterthwaite argues that while 
the Administration does not explicitly defend torture or extraordinary rendition “they
imply that the practice is legal by pointing to what they claim are lacunae in the relevant
legal frameworks” where “prohibitions give way to permission,” and “territories outside 
the United States are conceptualized as locations where the U.S. may act as it pleases.”
Id.
85. The Nazi’s refused to apply the Geneva and Hague Conventions of that era 
(precursors to the 1949 Conventions) to the eastern front, using arguments very similar to the
ones advanced by administration lawyers planning the war on terror.  As Scott Horton
points out, the Nazi’s avoided these conventions because:
1. the conflict was non-conventional and against a “barbaric” enemy; 
2. the opponent engaged in “terrorist” practices and were not entitled to 
protections under International Humanitarian Law;
3. the conventions were themselves obsolete; 
4. application of Geneva Conventions was not in the “enlightened self-interest 
of Germany” because of lack of reciprocation;
5. interpretation of the law “should be driven” by national self-interest; and
6. “the rules of international law were subordinated to the military interest of
the German state” as determined by the leader—Hitler.
Scott Horton, Through a Mirror Darkly: Applying the Geneva Conventions to “A New 
Kind of Warfare”, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 136, 145–46 (Karen J. Greenberg 
ed., 2006).  One can readily see how similar this reasoning was to that of the lawyers who 
devised the Bush Administration’s policies in this war.
86. Compare General-Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel calling the Geneva and Hague 
Conventions “the relic of a chivalrous notion of warfare,” (quoted in Horton, id. at 140) 
80
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Algeria, where torture, even as it enjoyed limited success87 in the battle
of Algiers, was ultimately self-defeating in that it led to “increased
domestic criticism, and loss of reputation in the world”88 while failing to
end the struggle. The lessons from Nazi Germany and the French
experience in Algeria teach that even where torture leads to useful short-
term information, in the long run it may not be successful. 
As we will see in the next two sections, the Administration’s lawyers
proceeded on debatable and probably false empirical premises about the 
efficacy of torture; they adopted hyper-technical analyses that justified a
pre-ordained result; and finally, they ignored all contrary evidence that
might have suggested a different approach.  Their approach was so hyper-
aggressive that some commentators argue for war crimes prosecution of 
these lawyers,89 and triggering an ethics investigation by the Justice 
Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility.90  Commentators
have since criticized the Administration in Boumediene’s wake as “badly 
overplaying a winning hand,” putting “the Supreme Court in an impossible
position: either rubber-stamp denials of due process to detainees who say 
they were seized by mistake, or create a new set of problems by making 
rules on a slow, messy, case-by-case basis.” 91 
with U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales’s statement “in my judgment, this new 
paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning . . . and renders quaint 
some of its provisions.” Memorandum for the President of Jan 25, 2002 from Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Decision Re-Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to 
Conflict With Al Qaeda and the Taliban, in THETORTURE PAPERS 119 (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).  See also, Rupert Cornwell, We do not torture, Insists Bush’s 
Choice for Attorney General, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 7, 2005, http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/we-do-not-torture-insists-bushs-choice-for-attorney-general-95570.html.
87. Although some attribute France’s victory in the Battle of the Casbah to the use 
of torture, political scientist Darius M. Rejali disputes this—arguing that torture played a 
minor and mostly counterproductive role, and that accurate intelligence and the 
cooperation of locals made the difference, not torture.  Darius M. Rejali, Does Torture
Work?, in  THE PHENOMENON OF TORTURE: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 255, 255–59
(William F. Schultz ed., 2007).  In any event, the backlash against torture ultimately cost
the French the war.
 88. Forsythe, supra note 82, at 470. 
89. Milan Markovic, Can Lawyers Be War Criminals?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
347 (2007).
90. Johnson, supra note 45, at A3. 
91. Stuart Taylor Jr., Overplaying Its Hand by Denying Gitmo Detainees Basic 
Legal Protections, The Bush Administration Forced the High Court to Act, NEWSWEEK, 
June 23, 2008, at 38 (quoting Charles Fried). 
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Whether some of these lawyers were “rogue operators” and “out of 
control” as some allege92 or were just aggressively93 representing 
presidential policy94 will be for historians, bar associations,95 the
Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility,96 and 
others97 to determine.  This Article will not review the evidence for
whether harsh interrogation methods work,98 nor will it expand upon 
92. Michael Isikoff and Evan Thomas report that a former aide to Attorney General 
John Ashcroft has said that one lawyer with the Office of Legal Counsel, John Yoo, was
seen as a rogue operator inside the Justice Department who was “out of control.”  Michael 
Isikoff & Evan Thomas, Bush’s Monica Problem, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 2007, at 27. 
93. Such aggressive representation raises ethical questions beyond the scope of this
Article.  George Annas points out that lawyers and judges were prosecuted at Nuremburg,
“and many, if not most Americans would see a similar prosecution of the lawyers who 
distorted the Nuremberg Principles, the Geneva Conventions, the Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights, and the Convention Against Torture, among other laws, as reasonable 
also.”  George J. Annas, Human Rights Outlaws: Nuremberg, Geneva, and the Global War
on Terror, 87 B.U. L.REV. 427, 463 (2007).  As José Alvarez points out “When governmental 
lawyers torture the rule of law as gravely as they have done here, international as well as 
national crimes may have been committed, including by the lawyers themselves.”  José 
E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 175, 223 (2006).  Moreover, 
legal advice cannot lawfully “provide a ‘road map’ for circumventing the law, and such
advice may result in the lawyer being “held complicit in the client’s criminal conduct.”
Bilder & Vagts, supra note 58. 
94. Christopher Kutz points out that given the thinness of the arguments “it is hard
not to conclude that the Bybee memo was meant more to frame and justify a policy 
position in ethical and political terms than to provide a legal analysis.”  Christopher 
Kutz, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV. 235, 248 (2007). 
95. Johnson, supra note 45. The National Lawyer’s Guild has filed a complaint 
with the California State Bar against former Defense Department general counsel William
Haynes II. Carol Williams reported that a lawyers group was targeting an ex-Bush 
administration official.  A complaint was also to be filed in Pennsylvania against John 
Yoo.  Carol J. Williams, Lawyers Guild Acts in Prisoner Abuse, L.A.TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, at
A8, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-torture17-2009mar17,0,486 
9203.story.
96. The New York Times reports, the Department of Justice’s Office of Professional
Responsibility has written a draft report criticizing the legal opinions of three Bush
administration lawyers connected to the torture memoranda. Scott Shane, Debating
Release of Interrogation Memos, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at A22. As of this writing, 
the report has not yet been published. Carrie Johnson, Report on Bush Policy May Come 
In 'Weeks,' WASH. POST, June 18, 2009, available at http://www.washington post.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/06/17/AR2009061701512.html. 
97. The Contra Costa Times reports that University of California officials are 
deciding whether to punish Professor John Yoo for misconduct in relation to his participation 
in the infamous torture memos.  Matt Krupnick, Yoo’s Work for White House could draw
UC Punishment, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, http://blogs.csun.edu/news/clips/ 
2009/03/23/yoo%E2%80%99s-work-for-white-house-could-draw-uc-punishment/. 
98. Torture arguably proved effective on at least a few occasions.  See, Richard A.
Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in TORTURE, ACOLLECTION 291, 295 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 2004). Historian Alfred W. McCoy, however, takes issue with these accounts,
arguing that torture advocates like Richard Posner and Alan Dershowitz misrepresent the 
facts.  One case cited where torture was allegedly effective revolved around the torture 
of an alleged terrorist in the Philippines.  Police were able to secure information that 
supposedly prevented an airliner from being blown up.  McCoy reports, however, that 
82
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historical parallels.99 The administration also sought to increase 
executive power, and that motive has been widely reported.100 Indeed, 
many of its actions can be seen from that perspective.101 However, 
analysis focused on presidential power is beyond the scope of this 
Article. This Article focuses exclusively on the “torture culture,”102 how
the MCA cloaks torture, and how Boumediene strips away that torture
cloak. 
the police got “all the important information . . . in the first few minutes, when they seized 
[the terrorist’s] laptop . . . . Most of the supposed details gained from the sixty-seven
days of torture that followed were . . . police fabrications that [the terrorist] mimed to end the
pain.” ALFRED W. MCCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE: CIA INTERROGATION, FROM THE 
COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR 112 (2006).  Others question whether torture ever works.
See, e.g., DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY 23 (2007). Moreover, the strongest
case demonstrating that torture has worked, has been debunked.  Stephanie Athey, The
Tale of Abudul Hakjm Murad, in ON TORTURE 87 (Thomas C. Hilde, ed., 2008). 
99. See supra notes 85–87. 
100. See, e.g., Peter S. Canellos, The Bush White House, a Mirror on Ford’s Travails,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2006, at A2. 
Cheney, Rumsfeld, and, to a lesser extent, George H.W. Bush—who took over
a demoralized CIA during the Ford administration—all came out of the 1970s 
convinced that Congress had used the unpopular Vietnam War and President 
Nixon’s Watergate scandal to restrict the powers of the presidency too much. 
Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Bush made it their mission to restore presidential power, a
goal that motivates the current president and his team.
Id. See also, Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, Pushing the Envelope on Presidential Power,
WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, at A1; Tracey Barnett, Cheney’s Legacy on the Line, NEW
ZEALAND HERALD, Feb. 24, 2006; Andrew Sullivan, Op-Ed., Imperial Bush Brought to
Heel, AUSTRALIAN, July 3, 2006, at 8; Andrew Sullivan, Founding Fathers Save 
America’s Soul, SUNDAY TIMES (London), July 2, 2006, at A14; Charlie Savage, Hail to
the Chief— Dick Cheney’s Mission to Expand—or ‘Restore’—The Powers of the 
Presidency, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2006, at C1. 
101. See John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, in The Changing Laws of War: Do We
Need a New Legal Regime After September 11?, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183 (2004),
for one of the strongest defenses of executive power  (arguing that anything, including
congressional legislation, that gets in the way of the president’s wartime powers as 
commander in chief is unconstitutional).  See Kutz, supra note 94, at 266–70, for a 
sharply critical view (arguing that the Bush Administration’s expansive view of executive 
power parallels that of the German philosopher Carl Schmidt, whose views helped to
justify the Nazi’s actions).  Kutz believes this view of executive power goes too far and 
that necessity cannot be used as a “rolling justification for Executive supremacy.”  Id. at
275. 
102. David Luban uses the term “torture culture.”  Luban, supra note 27, at 35. 
 83
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IV. TORTURE’S ROOTS: THE MILITARY ORDER OF
NOVEMBER 13, 2001
Almost immediately after the September 11 attacks, the Department of
Justice began planning to set the legal framework for a new kind of war. 
Department lawyers were urged to be “forward leaning,”103 to find ways
to justify legally what the administration planned as a “gloves off”104 
war that did “away with all restrictions.”105 
These notions laid the groundwork for a supportive legal opinion from
the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) that laid out 
the legal basis for military commissions.106  The President then issued the
Military Order of November 13,107 which authorized indefinite detention of
al-Qaeda members (and others connected thereto), and created military 
tribunals to try them. This order could not have been cast more 
sweepingly—it applied to any non-citizen who “is or was a member
of . . . al Qaeda,” who “engaged in, aided, or abetted, or conspired” in
terrorism or who prepared for such, or who “knowingly harbored” any of
the people so broadly described.108  As written, it could apply to someone
who unwittingly gave money to an organization associated with
terrorism;109 it could apply to the vaguest conspiracy regardless of its 
103. According to Bradford Berenson, former associate White House counsel “[l]egally,
the watchword became ‘forward leaning,’” which meant that key federal agencies
wanted to take risks and to be aggressive in their interpretation of the law.  Tim Golden,
After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at A1. 
104. Vice President Dick Cheney is reported to have said that “the CIA had to take 
the gloves off to combat global terrorism[,]” and is quoted as saying, “[y]ou have to have 
on the payroll some very unsavoury [sic] characters . . . [t]his is a mean, nasty, dangerous,
dirty business.  We have to operate in that area.”  Linda Diebel, Inside My CIA Diaries, 
TORONTO STAR, Mar. 30, 2003, at F1, available at https://lists.resist.ca/pipermail/project-x/
2003-March/002963.html. 
105. Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, former aide to Secretary of State Colin Powell “has
claimed that Cheney was the most prominent advocate . . . of mistreating prisoners under
interrogation” and that he wanted to eliminate all restrictions.  Gavin Esler,Will ‘Chief Crazy’ 
Cheney Face a War Crimes Trial?, DAILY MAIL (London), Dec. 5, 2005, at 18, available at
http://www.bookrags.com/highbeam/will-chief-crazy-cheney-face-a-war-20 051205-hb/. 
106. On November 6, 2001, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Patrick Philbin 
provided the memorandum to then Attorney General Alberto Gonzales that laid out the 
legal basis for military commissions arguing that the President has the inherent power to 
order them and cited Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) as precedent. 
107. Military Order of Nov.13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833–36 (Nov. 13, 2001), in
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 25–28 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua
L. Dratel eds., 2005). 
108. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 § 2(a) (Nov. 13, 2001). 
109. Judge Green wrote in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases: 
This Court explored the government’s position on the matter by posing a series 
of hypothetical questions . . . . In response to the hypotheticals, counsel for the 
respondents argued that the Executive has the authority to detain the following 
84
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stage or ability to accomplish anything consequential.  These broad 
definitions applied to anyone that the President in his sole and 
unreviewable discretion so determined. If the President claimed
someone was somehow connected to terrorism, that person became the
“worst of the worst.”110 Not surprisingly, this unfettered approach
misfired, pulling in people wholly unconnected with terrorism.111 
Overbreadth was not the only problem.  Once designated for detention, 
the new rules stacked the deck in favor of conviction.  Punishment, 
individuals until the conclusion of the war on terrorism: ‘[a] little old lady in
Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is a charity that helps
orphans in Afghanistan but [what] really is a front to finance al-Qaeda activities,’ . . . a
person who teaches English-to the son of an al Qaeda member, and a journalist
who knows the location of Osama Bin Laden but refuses to disclose it to
protect her source.
In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005) (Citations 
omitted).
110. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay as the “worst of the worst.” See, Toby Harden, Hunger Strike at Camp X-Ray Over
Ban on Turbans, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 1, 2002, at 15.  According to Air
Force General Richard Myers, “[t]hese are people that would gnaw through hydraulic 
lines in the back of a C-17 to bring it down,” Angus MacSwan & Charles Aldinger, 
‘Worst of the Worst’ Captives Arrive in Cuba: Taliban, al-Qaeda Detainees Jailed at 
U.S. Base Won’t be Protected by Geneva Convention, Says Rumsfeld, OTTAWA CITIZEN, 
Jan. 12, 2002, at A10. 
111. Among the people picked up in the war on terror were the Uyghurs who were the 
subject of habeas corpus proceedings before the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. See supra  notes 17–21 and related text.  The Uyghurs are an ancient group of 
Turkik Muslims living in China.  Fleeing Chinese oppression some fled to Afghanistan and 
from there went to Pakistan where they were picked up by Pakistani bounty hunters and sold 
to the U.S. which shipped them to Guantanamo Bay.  The Uyghur’s only connection to
terrorism seems to have been that they were in the wrong place at the wrong time.  Ulysses S.
Smith, “More Ours than Theirs”: The Uighurs, Indefinite Detention, and the Constitution, 40
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 265, 266–67 (2007). In 2006, five Uyghurs were released to Albania, and
in December 2006 lawyers filed suit on behalf of seven more, saying that the process by
which they were declared enemy combatants was flawed.  The Department of Defense is
defending the six year detention of another Uyghur, Huzaifa Parhat before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit because of his ties to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a 
separatist group in China that the U.S. has declared a terrorist organization. The U.S. admits 
that Parhat did not fight against the U.S. but, he still can be held under the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force Act of 2001.  Steve Czajkowski, DOJ Defends Detention of Uighur at
Guantanamo, THE JURIST, Apr. 4, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/jurist_search.php?q
=DOJ+Defends+Detention+of+Uighur+at+Guantanamo.  Originally, twenty-two Uyghurs
were sold for bounties, seventeen remain in custody.  Most have been cleared for release but 
no nation will as yet take them.  While some Uyghurs seek a determination that they are not
enemy combatants, others have sought legal protection through the Geneva Convention, 
seeking prisoner of war status.  Seema Saifee, Guantanamo’s Uighurs: No Justice in Solitary, 
JURIST, Apr. 6, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/ 2008/03/guantanamos-uighurs-no-
justice-in.php.
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including death, could follow trial based upon any evidence that had
“probative value to a reasonable person.”112 Hearsay on hearsay, even
hearsay gleaned from torture, might suffice. Moreover, the prisoner 
might never be able to challenge such evidence.  The order also provided 
for secrecy—cloaking classified or classifiable information—and 
allowed for convictions other than death “upon the concurrence of two-
thirds of the members of the commission present at the time of the
vote.”113 
Finally, and most problematically, the order precluded any remedy in 
any court anywhere.  The only appeal ran through the Secretary of 
Defense and the President.114  Thus, the very people who decided to
detain the non-citizen would be the ultimate “deciders.” 
In summary, any non-U.S. citizen deemed by the President to have an 
amorphous connection to terrorism could be picked up, tried, convicted, 
and even executed upon secret evidence, including evidence resulting 
from torture, and double or triple hearsay, without appeal to any neutral 
forum.  Although these tribunals were to be called “military commissions”
they were quite unlike earlier U.S. military commissions dating back to
the Revolutionary War, which, with exceptions,115 can be said to have
112. Military Order of Nov.13, supra note 108, § 4(c)(3). 
113. Id. § 4(c)(6).
114. Id. § 4(c)(8).
115. The trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita before a Military Commission in
Manila in 1945 is perhaps one of the more glaring examples of victor’s justice imposed 
on the defeated Japanese.  General Yamashita was held responsible for atrocities perpetuated
by his troops despite the fact that by the later stages of the war he had little control over 
those troops, and was not alleged to have “had any knowledge of the commission” of
these atrocities, nor did he commit or order them. Moreover, they occurred at a time when
“the American forces [had] done everything possible to destroy and disorganize [Japanese] 
lines of communication” to disrupt Yamashita’s control over these same personnel claimed to
have committed the atrocities. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 34 (1946) (Murphy, J. dissenting). 
The United States Supreme Court upheld his death sentence, over vigorous dissents by
Justices Murphy and Rutledge.  The decision set the standard for command responsibility on the
commander  with an “affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power 
and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian
population.”  Id. at 16. He was hanged on February 23, 1946. Yamashita’s trial has been
criticized for the nearly impossible command standard required. The International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia has rejected this strict liability standard. See, e.g., Anne E. Mahle,
Yamashita Standard, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/ justice/world_issues_yam.html.
On the other hand, Yamashita’s “doctrine of command responsibility [is] now recognized
in Article 28 of the Rome Statute.” George P. Fletcher, Hamdan Confronts the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 427, 463 (2007).  See also, 
Markovic, supra note 89, at 358 (pointing out that the ICTY held that a commander’s 
omissions can result in criminal responsibility). “By being present during the mistreatment, 
and yet not objecting . . . the accused was necessarily aware that such tacit approval would be
construed as a sign of his support and encouragement.”  Id.  However, even if the 
doctrine of command responsibility is moving in the direction of greater responsibility
for the actions of subordinates, it certainly was not at that stage in 1945, and moreover, 
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been reasonably fair and justified by the exigencies of war.116 
Contrariwise, the Bush administration argued that military necessity in 
this new type of war—without temporal or geographic boundaries— 
required that all alleged terrorists be held incommunicado without access 
to either lawyers or courts.117  The President’s order prevented any court 
challenge to detention.118  Initially even U.S. citizens, whom the President 
determined to be enemy combatants, were held incommunicado and 
without access to lawyers.119 
President Bush’s Memorandum of February 7, 2002 declared that the 
Geneva Conventions would cover neither Taliban nor al-Qaeda fighters. 
These Presidential Orders, together with Executive Branch redefinitions 
of torture120 and authorization of what has come to be called “torture 
Yamashita’s case seems to be an extreme example given Yamashita’s questionable
awareness of the atrocities committed by his troops.  Id.
The other problem with Yamashita’s trial is that it violates the principle of nulla poena
sine lege, the notion that there can be no punishment without prior law—that one must 
have warning that one’s conduct is not only wrong, but unlawful.  The fact of being an 
“unlawful combatant” did not have criminal consequences under the Hague Convention 
and it was a stretch for the U.S. to make such a crime during World War II.  The present 
military commissions suffer from this same defect providing an additional reason to 
oppose them as violating international law.  For a good discussion of this argument see,
George P. Fletcher, The Law of War and Its Pathologies, 38 COLOM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
517, 543–46 (2007). 
116. Detlev Vagts convincingly demonstrates in his short history of military
commissions that while not all were fair, many were, and that there is nothing inherently
unfair about their use in times of war.  Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commissions: 
A Concise History, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 35 (2007). 
117. David A. Martin, Judicial Review and the Military Commissions Act: On Striking
the Right Balance, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 344, 355 (2007). 
118. The President’s order states in part: 
[T]he individual  shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any
proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding
sought on the individual’s behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any
Sate thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international
tribunal. 
Military Order of Nov. 13, supra note 108, § 7(b)(2). 
119. Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi were both U.S. citizens labeled as “illegal
enemy combatants.”  The Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004),
discussed below, led to their being allowed access to lawyers and the U.S. judicial 
process. Padilla has since been convicted in a Miami Federal District Court.  He was 
sentenced on December 22, 2007 to seventeen years in prison.  Padilla Given Long Jail
Sentence, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2008,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7203276.stm. 
Hamdi and Padilla are the only U.S. citizens treated this way. Martin, supra note 117, at 
349. 
120. See infra Part V. 
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lite”,121 brought about the detention of alleged “unlawful enemy 
combatants”122 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  The Administration thought
that holding non-U.S. citizens outside of the jurisdictional confines of 
the United States would eliminate civilian court oversight.  This would,
it was then thought, protect the CIA and other interrogators from
prosecution under the War Crimes Act,123 the Anti-torture legislation,124 
or from violating the Foreign Affairs and Restructuring Act of 1998125 
(which prohibits sending people to places where they may be
tortured).126 
These actions were widely criticized and quickly challenged in the 
courts as being beyond the President’s power to act without congressional 
approval and violative of the courts’ right to review cases under statutory 
habeas corpus.127 The courts128 eventually invalidated the scheme
triggering the issues in Boumediene. 
V. LEGAL PERMISSION TO (CLOAK) TORTURE
Two important events followed President Bush’s Military Order of
November 13 setting up military commissions.  First, on December 27, 
2001, the administration settled on Guantanamo Bay for detaining what 
came to be called “unlawful enemy combatants” captured in the “war on
 121. Forsythe, supra note 82, at 477. 
122. The term “unlawful enemy combatant” did not imply criminal wrongdoing
under international law until the Supreme Court made the leap from “unlawful” to
“criminal.” Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).  George P. Fletcher calls this “one of the
greatest legal fallacies . . . ever encountered” because, among other things, it “confuses failure
to qualify for status” with crime, it is illogical, and it is not a crime that could be
recognized under international law.  In short, the creation of “enemy combatancy” is “an
American invention.”  George P. Fletcher, The Law of War and Its Pathologies, 38
COLOM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 517, 539–46 (2007). 
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2008). 
124. 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2008). 
125. Foreign Affairs and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 
§§ 2242, 2681–761 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2000)). 
126. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
127. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). Statutory habeas corpus under section 2241 is to be 
distinguished from common law habeas corpus jurisdiction set forth in Article I, Section
9 of the Constitution. Constitutional habeas embodies common law habeas corpus as 
inherited from Great Britain, whereas statutory habeas constitutes those statutory rights
that Congress is prepared to grant.  This is an instance where at least some common law 
rights have been enshrined in the Constitution and thereby partially insulated from legislative 
change. See generally, Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (majority opinion). 
128. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591–92 (2006), discussed infra. 
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terror.”129  By January 11, 2002 the first accused terrorists arrived at the
U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.130 
On December 28 the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel
provided its first legal opinion131 attempting to create a legal “black 
hole,” an area outside of oversight by courts or anyone else.  That 
opinion, by Patrick Philbin and John Yoo, argued that Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, lay beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts and thus prisoners 
held there would not be amenable to the writ of habeas corpus.  Philbin 
and Yoo did acknowledge that there was a “[n]on-frivolous argument” 
that Guantanamo Bay might be “within the territorial jurisdiction of a 
federal court.”132  Nevertheless, they reasoned, erroneously as it turned 
out, that the better legal conclusion was “that a district court cannot 
properly entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus by an 
enemy alien detained at Guantanamo Bay.”133 Detainees thus would be
beyond all legal process. 
In retrospect these two important moves—sending detainees to, and 
justifying a law-free zone at, Guantanamo Bay—prepared the way for
the MCA. While some other opinions received more notoriety,134 this
opinion, more than any other, set up the constitutional crisis that led to
Boumediene. Only a lawyer-free and court-free zone would permit the 
kind of hyper-aggressive legal interpretations that were to set the 
administrative and legislative branches of government on a collision 
course with the courts. 
Stripping the courts’ jurisdiction created a firestorm of criticism.135  Then
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales responded with an Op Ed piece 
129. Charles Lane, Terrorism Tribunal Rights Are Expanded: Draft Specifies Appeals,
Unanimity on Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2001, at A1. 
130. Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, Pushing the Envelop on Presidential Power, 
WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/cheney/chapters/pushing_
the_envelope_on_presi/index.html. 
131. Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo, Office of Legal 
Counsel, Department of Justice, to William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department 
of Defense, Re: Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba (Dec. 28, 2001), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 29 
(Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
132. Id. at 34.
133. Id. at 37.
134. By any standard, the most infamous memorandum issued by the OLC was the 
later withdrawn opinion by Jay S. Bybee concerning interrogation standards, which has 
come to be known pejoratively as the “torture memo.” Id. at 172. 
135. See, e.g, George Lardner, Jr., Legal Scholars Criticize Wording of Bush Order: 
Accused Can be Detained Indefinitely, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2001, at A10. 
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in The New York Times claiming that the order did not mean what it said
and that the courts would remain able to exercise the writ of habeas
corpus.136  That did not keep the administration from fighting to the end 
to prevent court review.137 
Next, the OLC wrote a series of opinions advising the President how 
to avoid the Geneva Conventions as to either al-Qaeda or the Taliban.138 
This culminated in the President’s Memorandum declaring that al-Qaeda 
was not covered by Geneva Conventions; it also held that while the 
Geneva Conventions technically applied to the Taliban, its detainees 
were all (without further hearing of any kind) unlawful combatants and 
not prisoners of war under Article 4 of the Conventions.  This single 
move arguably stripped not only the protections of the Geneva
Conventions from all combatants in Afghanistan, but it also stripped 
them of any protection under the War Crimes Act, which criminalized
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, as well as violations of 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.  It would have (had it
worked) the effect of completely insulating from prosecution those who
ordered or carried out torture. 
Screening off the courts, however, did not suffice.  The Administration 
also sought to change the rules by narrowing the definitional scope upon 
which any prosecution or lawsuit might act.  By far the most controversial 
move to strip out all protections and oversight came with the infamous 
“torture memo” from James Bybee to Gonzales.139  Legal scholars have
“The order is rife with constitutional problems and riddled with flaws,” said
Laurence H. Tribe, professor of constitutional law at Harvard.  He said its reach is
so sweeping that it could snap up not only terrorist leaders caught overseas but 
also any resident immigrant who might have once “knowingly harbored” a past 
or present member of al Qaeda or who is “believed” to have “aided or abetted . . .
acts in preparation” for international terrorism.
Id.  Tribe pointed out that the order also contains no definition of “international terrorism,” 
thereby inviting arbitrary and possibly discriminatory decisions about who is to be tried.
Bush’s directive also gives the commission jurisdiction to try people not only for 
violations of the laws of war, but also for all “other applicable laws.” Id.
136. Alberto R. Gonzales, Op-Ed., Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
30, 2001, at A27.
137. The Administration argued that Federal Courts had no habeas corpus
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court which ruled against them in Rasul v. Bush. Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 544 (2004) (holding that statutory habeas applied to the detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay).  The Administration vigorously argued after the jurisdiction stripping
MCA was enacted that the detainees lacked constitutional habeas as well; a position that
was rejected in Boumediene. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262. 
138. Greenberg, supra note 81. 
139. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal 
Counsel, Department of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: 
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, reprinted in
THE TORTURE PAPERS 172–217 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua Dratel eds., 2005). 
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labeled it a “laughingstock”140 and “a stunning failure of lawyerly
craft.”141 
That memo contained such a perversely narrow definition of torture 
that it deserves quotation at length:
[W]e conclude that torture . . . covers only extreme acts. . . . Where the pain is physical,
it must be of an intensity akin to that which accompanies serious physical injury
such as death or organ failure. Severe mental pain requires suffering not just at 
the moment of infliction but it also requires lasting psychological harm, such as
seen in mental disorders like post-traumatic stress disorder . . . . Because the
acts inflicting torture are extreme, there is significant range of acts that though
they might constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment fail 
to rise to the level of torture. (emphasis added). 
The goal was plain.  Having deprived the court oversight, a narrow 
definition restricting torture to things that cause death or organ failure, 
had it been successful, would have permitted the administration to say 
that it did not allow torture while encouraging interrogators—with 
impunity and without oversight—to engage in practices that most people 
would consider torture.  In short, the goal was to simultaneously evade 
and obfuscate. 
As we will see, after this stratagem began to unravel, the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 opened the door to the admission of evidence 
falling short of torture142 but which might be fairly characterized as
having been obtained using cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. 
This narrowing of the definition of torture expanded the kinds of harsh
interrogation techniques that plausibly can be claimed as lawful thereby 
reducing the chances a given interrogation practice might be found to 
have been “manifestly unlawful.” 
That this definition of torture met with such a storm of controversy
that it had to be withdrawn143 does not detract from the basic point that
 140. Luban, supra note 27, at 54. 
141. Harold Koh, Dean of the Yale Law School, quoted in Steven Gillers, Legal
Ethics: A Debate, in  THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 238 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 
2006).
142. It is because the DTA lacks a rule preventing derivative uses of evidence
obtained by torture (a “fruit of the poisonous tree” bar), that the DTA contains a loophole 
allowing evidence obtained through the use of outright torture.  Tom J. Farer, The Two 
Faces of Terror, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 363 (2007).  See infra text accompanying note 209. 
143. Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office 
of Legal Counsel, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards
Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A, Dec. 30, 2004, http://www.usdoj. 
gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf (basically revoking the memo from Bybee, Re: Interrogation Standards
from August 2002) [hereinafter Levin Memorandum].  This is the “new torture memo.” 
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the Administration sought, primarily through opinions from its Office of
Legal Counsel, to change the legal landscape to both permit and hide
torture. The critical point is that by setting up such a “torture culture”
(as David Luban puts it)144 torture became inevitable. When the courts
failed to go along, the game shifted to legislation to protect what had 
been done. This Article is primarily concerned with the consequences. 
Intent is often difficult to prove, and with institutions it is generally 
unnecessary.  However, intent here seems quite clear.  One does not so
radically change a definition otherwise. 
The Bybee torture memorandum (as well as other OLC memos) did
much more than redefine torture.145  In addition to creating a vanishingly 
narrow definition of torture, this memorandum also provided a definition 
of specific intent that claimed that one could not torture unless one 
specifically intended to harm or cause pain.  This suggested (without 
explicitly endorsing) that an interrogator would be free to cause even
intense pain so long as the intent was interrogation.146  Thus, plainly 
Note: this repudiation of the Bybee torture memo came before Gonzales’ confirmation 
hearing.
144. Luban, supra note 27, at 36. 
145. Significantly, most of these memoranda were never retracted during the Bush 
administration.  The OLC memoranda asserting sweeping presidential powers were retracted 
at the very end of the Bush administration.  Five days before the end, the Justice Department
issued a secret retraction of some of the most sweeping assertions of presidential authority.
Josh Meyer & Julian Barnes, Memos Gave Bush Overriding Powers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3,
2009, at A1. 
146. For example, the recently released secret memorandum of August 1, 2001 
from Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, to John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of
the Central Intelligence Agency, says that “a defendant acts in good faith when he has an
honest belief that his actions will not result in severe pain or suffering.”  Memorandum 
for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, Interrogation 
of al Qaeda Operative, Aug. 1, 2002, at 16, available at http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/
Guardian/documents/2009/04/16/bybee_to_rizzo_memo.pdf [hereinafter Bybee Memorandum].
This statement came after a detailed analysis, which argued that since the suffering of 
waterboarding and other harsh interrogation techniques was not prolonged, it did not
meet the definition of torture. Thus, the memorandum blurs the line between torture and 
lawful interrogation by asserting certain conduct was not calculated to cause pain within
that highly circumscribed understanding of suffering.  It then went on to say that if the 
interrogators intent was not to cause suffering, then even if he or she did, they would not 
have violated the law. Id.  Moreover, the agent’s belief that the interrogation was not
causing suffering within this extremely limited definition, did not even have to be a 
“reasonable belief” only an “honest belief.”  Id.  Thus, it seems that an honest but unreasonable 
belief that the detainee’s suffering, however intense, would not be “prolonged” sufficed
to insulate the interrogator from criminal liability.  Id.  David Luban says: the phrase
“specific intent” is a criminal lawyer’s term of art—unfortunately, one that has multiple
meanings and that many lawyers find confusing.  The Bybee Memo adopts one of these 
competing meanings, namely that to “specifically intend” some consequence when performing
an action means to perform the action for the purpose of achieving that consequence.  In 
other words, achieving the consequence is the goal of the action, not simply a foreseen
but unintended by product of it.  Knowingly inflicting pain on someone isn’t torture 
unless your purpose is to inflict severe pain.  As the Memo puts it, “the infliction of such
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foreseeable pain might not count if one sought information.147 The
Bybee memorandum also posits (as do other OLC memos from the Bush
administration) that Congress lacks the power to prohibit torture if 
performed under the direction of the President. (This, of course, renders 
the distinction between torture and CID irrelevant—at least insofar as
this argument ultimately prevails).  These parts of the Bybee memorandum 
remained intact.148  The Bush administration moved grudgingly to head
off the worst criticism without changing course. 
There are far too many OLC memoranda, as well as memoranda from 
the military, the State Department, and the Vice President’s office, to
review them all.149  The important point is that the Administration 
sought to screen its actions from both legislative and judicial oversight 
and sought to create a permissive regime that would allow torture and 
cruel interrogation practices. The Administration has also deployed the 
state secrets privilege in order to prevent civil suits alleging torture or 
extraordinary rendition from going forward—even to the discovery
stage. 150 It has thus avoided, until Boumediene,151 detailed judicial or
legislative oversight.152 
pain must be the defendant’s precise objective.” It goes on to explain that “knowledge 
alone that a particular result is certain to occur does not constitute specific intent.” 
Luban, supra note 27, at 59. 
147. Luban, supra note 27, at 59–62.  However, the recently released Memorandum 
of August 1, 2002 does acknowledge that “a single event of sufficiently intense pain may
fall within this prohibition.”  Bybee Memorandum, supra note 146, at 9.  This same  
memorandum concluded, however, that severe pain would only occur if it “is of an
intensity akin to the pain accompanying serious physical injury” including “severe
beatings with weapons such as clubs, and the burning of prisoners.” Id. at 10. 
148. See Levin Memorandum, supra note 143 (as to the sweeping claims of executive
powers).
149. Most of these documents are collected in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO
ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). 
150. El-Masri v. Tenet, 479 F.3d 296, 308 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 
373 (2007) (state secrets privilege precluded litigation of El-Masri’s claims which 
included kidnapping, rendition and torture); see also, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d
250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d en banc, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008) (the government in
Arar raised the state secrets privilege however, the case was decided on other grounds). 
151. Boumediene, by providing habeas access to detainees, promises to change that
by permitting access to civilian courts. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262. 
152. Detainees picked up in Iraq and Afghanistan, held in U.S. military facilities, 
allegedly tortured and then released without charge have also been unsuccessful in
seeking civil damage remedies in U.S. courts.  At least one lower court has said that the
Constitution does not encompass nonresident aliens injured extraterritorially while 
detained by the U.S. military in foreign countries.  In Re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees
Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 95 (D.D.C. 2007).  It remains to be seen whether this 
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VI. AMAJORITY IN THE SUPREME COURT STRIKES BACK
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court decided three cases directly
related to the detention of alleged terrorists.  In those cases, the
government had one victory on a narrow procedural point.  This was 
tempered by the fact that the other two cases, decided the same day,
made clear that its lone victory would be short-lived.
A. Rumsfeld v. Padilla153 
The government started with a pyrrhic win, resorting to discreditable 
tactics in eking out the narrow win. The government picked up a U.S. 
citizen, Jose Padilla, on a material witness warrant and transported him 
to the Southern District of New York to appear before a grand jury
investigating the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  Court-appointed 
counsel sought to vacate the warrant, and the court set a hearing date.
The government moved quickly and secretly to deprive the court of
jurisdiction. On June 9, 2002, while the matter was still pending, 
President Bush determined Padilla to be an “enemy combatant”
associated with al Qaeda and directed that the Secretary of Defense take 
custody of him from the Department of Justice.  Government attorneys 
later that day, and without notice to defense counsel, notified the court 
ex parte that the government was withdrawing its grand jury subpoena. 
The court that day (a Sunday, when court is not ordinarily in session) 
vacated the warrant, and the Department of Defense immediately
ruling will hold up.  It can be argued that while the Constitution may not apply with full 
force to aliens who are outside of territorial United States, certain fundamental rights 
such as Due Process do apply. Under this theory, the government cannot act in ways that 
“shock the conscience.”  See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, The Ties That Bind: How the
Constitution Limits the CIA’s Actions in the War on Terror, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1805,
1828–29 (2006). The cases that come closest to answering this question are Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004), Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480–81 (2004), and 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2247 (2008), all of which are discussed. Hamdi
was a U.S. citizen allegedly captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan who was entitled
to due process. Does the Hamdi and Boumediene rule (or perhaps some watered-down
variant thereof) extend to non-resident aliens?  None of these cases satisfactorily answer 
the question.  The fact that constitutional habeas corpus applies to detainees does not say
whether or not other constitutional rights will apply.  Moreover, Maqaleh v. Gates will 
not, even if upheld on appeal, answer this question as that case could be limited to the reach of
habeas corpus as well.  See infra notes 273–274 and accompanying text; Maqaleh v. Gates, 
No.06-1669, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51593 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2009).  In Rasul v. Myers (a
somewhat analogous case arising out of Guantanamo Bay), the Supreme Court has 
vacated and remanded a lower court decision denying a variety of tort claims arising out 
of alleged torture and brutal treatment.  The case was “remanded to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for further consideration in light of
Boumediene v. Bush. Rasul v. Myers, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008). 
153. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
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transferred Padilla to a naval brig in South Carolina.  A majority on the
U.S. Supreme Court found no fault with those tactics and dismissed the 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the Southern District of New 
York.154 
The issue before the Court came down to whether the petition was 
properly filed in New York where Padilla had been until secretly
removed, or in South Carolina where his immediate custodian was
located. The Court ruled 5 to 4 that Padilla would have to start over in
South Carolina.  According to the majority, the government’s tactics did 
not change the usual (but not exceptionless) rule that a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus must be filed in the district where the immediate 
custodian is located. The various other court-created exceptions were
held not to control.
What is most troubling about this ruling is not discussed in any of the 
justices’ opinions.  Not only did the government resort to a secret ex
parte proceeding, it did so in order to gain a clear tactical advantage.
Any lawyer familiar with the rulings of the various circuit and district
courts will recognize that the Southern District of New York and the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals would ordinarily be a far more 
hospitable forum for Padilla than the more conservative federal courts 
with jurisdiction in South Carolina.  Unquestionably, Padilla would also 
have been more able in New York to procure a timely hearing on the
merits and create a record than in South Carolina. Moreover, in New 
York, Padilla was not in the custody of the Department of Defense and 
this could materially affect interrogation techniques as well as access to
counsel. If one assumes the lower federal courts to be fungible and the
custodian irrelevant, then one might argue that Padilla suffered no real 
loss other than delay.  Lawyers could (and did) re-file in South Carolina.155 
154. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, O’Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion joined by
O’Connor, J., and Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer JJ.  Id. at 429. 
155. A petition for habeas corpus was filed in the United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina, decided in Padilla v. Hanft, holding that the President 
lacked the authority to detain him and that he must be criminally charged or released. 
Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 681 (2005).  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the detention was lawful.  Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582 (2005),
cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006).  On April 14, 2007 Padilla’s trial began in Miami.  His 
conviction by the government changed his designation from enemy combatant to criminal 
defendant in December 2005, just before a Supreme Court deadline on certiorari might
have forced “precedent setting review.”  Mischa Gaus, Interrogations Behind Barbed Wire:
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Such a view distorts reality.  The government engaged in forum shopping
and got away with it.  The immediate goals were time, a more sympathetic
court, and the ability to coercively interrogate Padilla without interference 
from civilian lawyers.  In part because of the implications of the Rasul
case (described below), decided two years later by the Supreme Court, 
Padilla was ultimately charged, tried, and convicted in Miami.  Thus, in 
the end, the government’s strategy of hiding Padilla from the courts 
failed. 
Padilla, which involved a U.S. citizen arrested on U.S. soil,156 was the
government’s weakest case, reaching the outer limits of what government 
lawyers were claiming for Presidential authority.  It is one thing to claim 
that the Constitution does not extend offshore to Guantanamo or 
Afghanistan, or that it does not apply to non-U.S. citizens who are not
Who’s to Blame for America’s New Torture Techniques?, IN THESETIMES,  Feb. 2007, at 26.
156. The only other civilian that the author is aware of who was arrested in the U.S. 
and held as an enemy combatant was Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, an alien 
lawfully residing in the United States, who was arrested in Peoria for credit card fraud and
lying to federal agents.  The President declared him to be an enemy combatant and the
Department of Defense moved him to the Navy brig in S.C.  He was allegedly threatened 
with torture and treated harshly. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was successful
in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ordered the district court to issue a writ of 
habeas corpus directing his release from military custody.  Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d
160 (4th Cir. 2007). Judge Motz wrote:
To sanction such presidential authority to order the military to seize and 
indefinitely detain civilians, even if the President calls them “enemy combatants,”
would have disastrous consequences for the Constitution—and the Country. 
For a court to uphold a claim to such extraordinary power would do more than 
render lifeless the Suspension Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the rights to 
criminal process in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and eighth Amendments; it would 
effectively undermine all of the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.  It is
that power—were a court to recognize it—that could lead all our laws “to go
unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces.”  We refuse to recognize 
a claim to power that would so alter the constitutional foundations of our
Republic.
Id. at 195. 
Ultimately, the Obama administration gave up on holding al-Marri as an enemy combatant.
He was transferred to civilian authorities and charged with providing material aid to
terrorists, to which he initially pled not guilty.  The District Judge overseeing his case 
then ruled that he must remain in custody until tried, as he has failed to prove that he is 
not a danger to the community.  Bhargav Katikaneni, ‘Enemy Combatant’ al-Marri to be 
Tried in U.S. Criminal Court, JURIST, Feb. 27, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/
2009/02/enemy-combatant-al-marri-to-be-tried-in.php; Amelia Mathias, Al-Marri Pleads 
Not Guilty to Terrorism Charges, JURIST, Mar. 24, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
paperchase/2009/03/al-marri-pleads-not-guilty-to-terrorism.php. On April 30, 2009, al-
Marri plead guilty to providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. As a part of the agreement, al-Marri agreed not to 
appeal any sentence that he might receive, not to pursue a writ of habeas corpus, and not 
to oppose deportation to Qatar or Saudi Arabia after his sentence has been served. 
Bhargav Katikaneni, Al-Marri Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charges in Federal Court, 
JURIST, May 1, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/05/al-marri-pleads-guilty-to-
terrorism.php.
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found in the United States.  Here the claim was that the President could
call a U.S. citizen an enemy combatant, have him arrested within the
United States, and then hold him incommunicado indefinitely.  It is not 
surprising that the Administration sought to delay and move the 
proceedings to a more hospitable venue. 
Moreover, the Administration must have thought it would be able to
fend the lawyers off and in any event prevent Padilla from coming to a 
civilian court.  It is important to recognize that Padilla was spirited out 
of New York in 2002.  This was prior to the Administration’s later 2004 
defeat in the two other cases (decided the same day as Padilla), Rasul157 
and Hamdi,158 which made Padilla’s appearance in a civilian court
inevitable. Thus, Padilla is important more for what it shows about the 
government’s tactics in keeping detainees out of the courts and away
from public disclosure, than it is for its holding.  It provides evidence 
that early on the Bush administration sought to engage in and hide,
harsh, and coercive interrogations, while denying that its practices could 
be what they appeared to be. 
Padilla was tried in 2007 in Federal District Court in Miami and, along 
with two others, was convicted of conspiring to murder in Chechnya, 
Afghanistan, Bosnia, and elsewhere. On January 23, 2008 he was sentenced 
to serve seventeen years in prison.  The government’s original charge, 
that Padilla plotted to detonate a radioactive “dirty bomb,” never 
surfaced and is presumably forever gone.  Moreover, the judge also ruled
that “[t]here is no evidence that these defendants personally maimed, 
kidnapped, or killed anyone in the United States or elsewhere.”159  Thus,
the government’s most incendiary charges were never proved.  The 
government has denied Padilla’s allegations of torture,160 but the judge
in the case agreed that he was subjected to “harsh conditions” and 
“extreme stresses.”161 
157. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004). 
158. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004). 
159. Padilla Given Long Jail Sentence, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2008, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/americas/7203276.stm.
160. Padilla Guilty in U.S. Terror Trial, BBC NEWS, Aug. 16, 2007, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6950333.stm. 
161. BBC NEWS, supra note 159 (Judge Cooke is quoted as saying that Padilla had
been subjected to “harsh conditions” and “extreme environmental stresses” at a Navy jail 
in South Carolina). 
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B. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld162 
Yasser Esam Hamdi was a dual U.S and Saudi citizen picked up in 
Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance in 2001 and turned over to the
Americans.  He was declared an “illegal enemy combatant” and transported
to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  Upon discovery that he was a U.S. citizen, 
the government transferred him to a navy brig in South Carolina. 
Hamdi raises an interesting question about the rights of a U.S. citizen 
abroad.  Unlike Padilla, who was arrested in Chicago, Hamdi was captured
in Afghanistan and was alleged to have been fighting alongside of the 
Taliban militia.163  The fact, however, that he was turned over by the
Northern Alliance suggests that bounty money may have had more to do 
with his capture than any actual guilt in fighting against the United
States,164 and Hamdi steadfastly denied that he ever took up arms against 
the U.S. or its allies.
Hamdi held that a citizen, even if picked up on a foreign battlefield, 
could not be held indefinitely without charges. At a minimum, he had a 
right to notice of the charges against him and a hearing of some ill-
defined sort. Nonetheless, if captured-in-Afghanistan Hamdi had due
process rights then Padilla a fortiori had rights, so Hamdi explains why 
the government subsequently acceded to a trial for Padilla in a civilian
court. This access to some process entailed the right for someone who 
has been declared an enemy combatant to “receive notice of the factual
basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s
factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker.”165  Writing for the
plurality, Justice O’Connor said, “[w]e have long since made clear that a 
state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the 
rights of the Nation’s citizens.”166  By itself, this case is of limited reach 
in that it only applied to U.S. citizens, surely a small subset of those
detained in the war against terror.  Nonetheless, this case breached the 
administration’s most extravagant claim: that the President could declare
anyone at anytime an enemy combatant, and hold that person without
any process whatsoever.
162. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507. 
163. Saudi-American Released to Riyadh, BBC NEWS., Oct. 11, 2004, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/americas/3733942.stm.
164. See JOSEPH MARGUILLES, GUANTANAMO, AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER 68–69 ( 2006), for a good account of how innocent people were swept up by the 
Northern Alliance for bounty monies ranging as high as $5000 for Taliban and $20,000 
for al-Qaeda (huge sums for that part of the world).  The Uyghurs are another example of 
how innocent people simply got swept into Guananamo by the Northern Alliance seeking
bounty monies.  See Shaulis, supra note 20. 
165. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. 
166. Id. at 536. 
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Hamdi’s grant of access to a hearing seems to have had disastrous
consequences for the U.S. position. Rather than try him for his alleged
crimes, the U.S. reached an agreement with him and deported him to 
Saudi Arabia. Hamdi, who was never charged with any crime, spent 
over two years in captivity before surrendering U.S. citizenship.167 
This is the troubling aspect of this case.  Had the government 
possessed truly persuasive evidence that Hamdi was a dangerous person 
who might return to the battle against the U.S., it surely would have
made some effort to prove a case against him or found some other basis 
for holding him.  While it is possible that the evidence against him was
so secret that it could not be disclosed, the fact that he was turned over 
by the Northern Alliance suggests otherwise.  Hamdi may have been one 
more innocent person swept up and sent wrongly to Guantanamo.  At the 
least, he does not seem to have been a dangerous terrorist as initially
claimed. 
C. Rasul v. Rumsfeld168 
Rasul was the third, last, most difficult, and most significant of the 
terrorism cases decided during the Supreme Court’s 2004 term.169 
Petitioners were non-citizens held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and
therefore outside the territorial United States.  The Court decided the
case on the narrowest possible ground, holding that the statutory writ of
habeas corpus170 applied to non-citizens detained at the Guantanamo Bay 
naval base. The case turned on the fact that, notwithstanding Cuba’s
ultimate sovereignty over the area, the U.S. naval base there was subject
to the United States’ exclusive jurisdiction.  Cuban law had no application,
so a different ruling would have left Guantanamo Bay wholly outside of 
any law.  This ruling, however, had the potential of wiping out the 
administration’s entire strategy of creating a law-free zone where alleged
terrorists could be held and, more importantly, interrogated without
judicial oversight.
By deciding the case on statutory grounds, the Supreme Court avoided
deciding a more difficult constitutional question. The U.S. Constitution 
167. Saudi-American Released to Riyadh, supra note 163. 
168. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466. 
169. The Court often saves its most difficult and contentious cases to the end of the 
term, releasing them just before the summer recess.  By any measure, Padilla, Hamdi and 
Rasul raised difficult issues of national importance. 
170. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–43 (2006). 
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provides that “[t]he privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.”171  This is the only human right specified in the
original Constitution, and arguably the most important.172  The founders
were unquestionably aware of the bitter fights over the Great Writ 
during the reign of the Stuarts, as well as the battle to secure the benefits 
of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 for those colonies as to which it did 
not apply.173 
The narrow basis for the Court’s decision left open the possibility that 
Congress might change the law adversely to the detainees.  It also left 
open the possibility, later addressed in Boumediene, that congressional 
action could be trumped if constitutional habeas corpus applied to 
executive detention of non-citizens outside of the United States.  Congress 
may alter a statute at any time, but, absent constitutional amendment, 
Congress cannot change the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution.174  Because the Court is wary of trumping the democratic
process unnecessarily, the Court usually decides cases on narrowest
possible grounds.175  However, the legislative response to Rasul led, as 
we will see, directly to Boumediene. 
VII. THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO
PADILLA, HAMDI AND RASUL
These three cases are important for the executive branch and 
legislative branch reactions they triggered in a scramble to save the
administration’s carefully constructed law-free interrogation zone.  First, 
171. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
172. The Bill of Rights came into effect in 1791, two years after the Constitution
was ratified in 1789. U.S. CONST. amends. I–X. 
173. See, e.g., Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 375, 391–93 (1998). 
174. Chief Justice John Marshall famously declared, “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the
rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict
with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”  Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. 87, 111 (1803). The doctrine of judicial review was emphatically reaffirmed as 
recently as June 28, 2006.  Sanchez-Llamas v. Johnson, 548 U.S. 331, 354 (2006).  In so
far as the MCA purports to tell the courts how to interpret the Geneva Conventions, it 
arguably runs afoul of this doctrine.  For a discussion of this debate compare Curtis A.
Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva Conventions, 
101 AM. J. INT’L L. 322, 337–38 (2007) (arguing that Congress has the power to do this), 
with Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva Conventions,
and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 AM. J. INT’L L.73, 90–91 (2007) (arguing that 
Congress lacks this power). 
175. See Martin, supra note 117, at 346, for a favorable discussion of the Supreme 
Court’s restraint in these cases.
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the Department of Defense narrowly interpreted the scope of the
(admittedly ill-defined) hearings required by Rasul by setting up 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs).  These featured restrictive 
rules that, among other things, failed to provide a detainee with
sufficient information to defend himself, gave an overly vague definition 
of “enemy combatant,” and failed to adequately handle accusations of 
torture. Next, Congress rushed through the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005, which, among other things, purported to strip the federal courts of 
habeas jurisdiction. Neither the President nor Congress appears to have 
been anxious to have the courts inquire into the Guantanamo detainee’s 
cases.
A. Combatant Status Review Tribunals
Hamdi required at a minimum some sort of process for detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The government’s immediate response was to
create Combatant Status Review Tribunals176 to determine the detainees’ 
status. The government argued that this responded to the requirement 
that the government provide detainees with due process.  In retrospect,
given how these tribunals have worked, this seems to have been another
move enabling the Administration to hide what it was doing from the 
rest of the world.177 As we will see, the interrelationship between the
CSRTs and the MCA would have, but for Boumediene, allowed the
government to hide outright torture, not just “harsh” interrogation 
methods or merely cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. 
The CSRTs allowed for secret evidence, hearings outside of the
presence of defense counsel, use of hearsay upon hearsay, and a vague 
and overbroad definition of “enemy combatant.”178  Moreover, the
176. Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal, July 7, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707 
review.pdf (CSRT Order). 
177. The most complete description of problems with the CSRT process is found in 
JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 160–81 
(2006). Margulies outlines problems with overbreadth in covering people forced to work
with the Taliban in minor roles, hiding and ignoring of exculpatory evidence (even when
overwhelming), secret hearings, use of secret evidence, presumptions in favor of the evidence
presented by the military, lack of impartial decision makers, and lack of counsel. “In
short, the conclusion is simply inescapable that these tribunals were created for no other 
purpose than to validate a predetermined result.” Id. at 169. 
178. Brief for Amnesty International et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2007) (Nos. 06-1195, 1196). 
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CSRTs have simply ignored evidence that cleared detainees.  A
detainee’s innocence of any crime, it seems, was irrelevant.  Indeed, the
record and findings of the hearings were in some cases kept from the
detainee and the material classified and thereby effectively hidden from 
the public. The press reported that the military possessed compelling 
evidence in 2002 clearing a detainee, Murat Kurnaz.  The evidence 
seemed sufficiently clear by then that a German intelligence officer 
wrote that the United States considered his “innocence proven” and 
predicted his quick release. Nonetheless, Kurnaz languished in Guantanamo
until 2006 and even after release had to sue to compel release of the 
classified documents in his case.  Even more damaging to the U.S.
position, a U.S. district court judge ruled in 2005 that Kurnaz did not
receive a “fair opportunity to contest the material allegations against
him.”179  The best summary description of the CSRTs comes in an amici 
brief filed with the Supreme Court in Boumediene, 
The CSRTs consist of panels of three military officers who are “not bound by the 
rules of evidence such as would apply in a court of law” and may consider any
information—including classified, hearsay, and coerced information—in making
their determination as to whether, by a “preponderance of the evidence” the detainee
is “properly detained as an enemy combatant”.  The detainee is not entitled to legal
counsel and is not entitled to have access to or know the details of any classified
evidence used against him.  There is a presumption that the Government Information
submitted to the CSRT in support of the detainee’s classification as an “enemy
combatant” is “genuine and accurate.”180 
Furthermore, under the CSRT procedure, a person classified as an “enemy
combatant” could be held indefinitely—potentially a life sentence— 
regardless of whether a military commission ever convicts him of
anything.181  The government under the Bush administration justified
this by claiming that it was keeping enemy combatants from returning to 
the battle. 
The practice of utilizing repeated hearings until the tribunal finally
reaches the desired result remained a serious problem during the Bush 
administration.  In at least three cases, CSRT panels returned “not/no 
179. Caitlin Price reports that “[n]ewly declassified court documents” cleared German-
born Turkish citizen Murat Kurnaz in 2002, but he was not released until 2006 and had to sue 
to compel the release of the classified documents.  Furthermore, newly declassified portions
of the 2005 opinion in, In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, by U.S. District Court Judge 
Green state that “Kuraz did not receive a ‘fair opportunity to contest the material allegations
against him.’”  Caitlin Price, Guantanamo Tribunal Ignored Evidence Clearing German-Born 
Detainee: WP, JURIST, Dec. 6, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/12/guantanamo-
tribunal-ignored-evidence.php#. 
180. Amnesty International et al., supra note 178. 
181. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2229. 
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longer” an enemy combatant determinations.182 The Department of
Defense simply ordered new CSRTs.  None of the detainees was told of 
the first decision. In two cases the government’s second panel found the
detainee to be an enemy combatant; in the third case it took three 
separate panels before the government procured the desired result—a 
finding that the detainee was an enemy combatant. 183 
Did the new CSRT panels receive new evidence supporting the 
detainee’s enemy combatant status?  Not necessarily.  In the case of
Abdul Hamid al-Ghizzawi the government appears to have simply taken
the “old evidence and then stamped the word classified on it.”184  The  
next panel again found the evidence insufficient and again found him not 
to be an enemy combatant.185  The Department of Defense again sent it 
back to finally achieve the desired outcome. 
One can only surmise why senior military officers did not want to 
release these people. Were they tortured?186  Could it be that their stories 
about their treatment will damage the U.S.?  Thomas Sullivan, a former 
U.S. Attorney who is representing several Saudis at Guantanamo said, 
“It’s a joke. It’s a sham.”187 
CSRTs facilitated another practice that is, if anything, even more 
shocking to anyone who values fair trial practices. Recall that Hamdi
required that detainees be given a fair opportunity to defend themselves 
from the charge that they were “enemy combatants.”  The CSRTs,
however, allowed the use of classified and secret evidence that the 
detainee could not see.  So much of the evidence was thus kept from the
detainee that he could not make sense of the charges or meaningfully
answer or defend.  The following comes from the District Court’s opinion 
182. The wording, “not/no longer” is interesting in that it seems to suggest
that a person might have been properly classified as an enemy combatant but in some ill-
defined way no longer merits that status.  The implication seems to be that the government 
correctly detained an individual and properly subjected him to harsh interrogations, even
though there was not sufficient evidence to continue to hold him. Thus, detainees are, like
Kafka’s Joseph K., “traduced . . . without having done anything wrong.” FRANZKAFKA, THE 
TRIAL 1 (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1964). 
183. Tom J. Farer, The Two Faces of Terror, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 363, 377 (2007)
184. RON SUSKIND, THE WAY OF THEWORLD 99–100 (2008).
185. Id. at 224. 
186. Whether one considers it torture, Ghizzawi’s treatment seems harsh and degrading,
apparently including suffering cold temperatures, being kept naked, made to act like a 
dog, kept without medical care, threatened with death and rape, bound for hours in excruciating 
stress positions,  and other humiliations. Id. at 131. 
187. Farer, supra note 183 at 371. 
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in In Re Guantanamo Detainee Cases.188  In reading a list of allegations
forming the basis for the detention of Mustafa Ait Idr, a petitioner, the
Recorder of the CSRT asserted, “While living in Bosnia, the Detainee 
associated with a known Al Qaida operative.”  In response, the following 
exchange occurred: 
Detainee: Give me his name. 
Tribunal President: I do not know. 
Detainee: How can I respond to this?
Tribunal President: Did you know of anybody that was a member of Al Qaida?
Detainee: No, no.
Tribunal President: I’m sorry, what was your response?  Detainee: No. 
Tribunal President: No? 
Detainee: No.  This is something the interrogators told me a long while ago.  I 
asked the interrogators to tell me who this person was.  Then I could tell you if I
might have known this person, but not if this person is a terrorist.  Maybe I knew
this person as a friend.  Maybe it was a person that worked with me.  Maybe it
was a person that was on my team.  But I do not know if this person is Bosnian,
Indian or whatever.  If you tell me the name, then I can respond and defend myself
against this accusation.
Tribunal President: We are asking you the questions and we need you to respond to
what is on the unclassified summary. (citations omitted)
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the CSRT process was set up 
in order to evade to the maximum extent possible Hamdi’s fair hearing 
requirement.  The goal seems to have been to continue to hide the 
government’s treatment of detainees.
B. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005189 
The Administration’s second response to the Padilla, Hamdi, and 
Rasul trilogy was to seek a congressional override.  Congress responded 
with the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) effective December 30, 2005.
The DTA set up a variety of technical rules for the interrogation of 
detainees and purports to prohibit torture (although as we will see,
torture returns through the backdoor).  Moreover, evidence stemming 
from coercive interrogations conducted before the effective date of the 
DTA is specifically permitted.  Most importantly, it attempted to reverse 
Rasul’s holding that detainees at Guantanamo Bay would have access to
188. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 469 (2005). 
189. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 
2739, 2742–43 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2005)). 
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civilian courts through the statutory writ of habeas corpus.  The Act
attempted to strip habeas jurisdiction from the federal courts and
substituted the Defense Department’s Combatant Status Review
Tribunals, with a limited appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia.190  This appeal was limited to whether the Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal followed its own procedures and its decision
was consistent with any other applicable laws.  It provided for a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence.  Shockingly, but
understandably, the government (albeit unsuccessfully) attempted to 
argue that even on appeal it could withhold exculpatory evidence.191 
(The Court of Appeals eventually rejected that extreme assertion).192 
Congress and the Administration were once again trying to head off any 
civilian review or oversight of Guantanamo Bay’s prisoners. 
Most importantly, notwithstanding the Act’s ban on torture, the 
President’s signing statement193 said that the law shall be construed, “in 
a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to 
supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and 
consistent with the constitutional limitations on judicial power.” With
190. Review is limited to whether the CSRT proceeding was consistent with its own 
“standards and procedures,” id. § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i), and whether those procedures are 
consistent with the Constitution “to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United 
States are applicable,” id. § 1005(e)(2)(C)(ii), while providing that “[n]othing in this 
section shall be construed to confer any constitutional right on an alien detained as an
enemy combatant outside the United States.” Id. § 1005(f).  Moreover, the right of appeal is
limited to verdicts that impose a sentence of death or a prison term of 10 or more years.
Finally, detainees have no ability to seek protection against torture or cruel, inhumane or
degrading treatment.  See, e.g., Jamie Mayerfeld, Playing by Our Own Rules: How U.S. 
Marginalization of International Human Rights Law Led to Torture, 20 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 89, 107 (2007). 
191. Patrick Porter, reported that the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
ruled that it will not reconsider the order of July 2007 where it ruled that in  “enemy
combatant” designations the appeals court would review all evidence regarding the detainee.
The Court rejected the government’s claim that the Pentagon should be able to select
which evidence is presented to the court on appeal and leave out evidence that could clear a
detainee.  Patrick Porter, Federal Appeals Court Refuses to Reconsider ‘Enemy Combatant’ 
Evidence,  JURIST, Feb. 1, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/02/federal-appeals-
court-refuses-to.php. 
192. See, Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007), reh’g denied, Bismullah v.
Gates, 501 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2007), reh’g en banc denied, Bismullah v. Gates, 514 
F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
193. President’s statement on signing the Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic
Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1918 (Jan. 2, 2006), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html. 
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this statement, President Bush, implicitly but clearly, declared that, 
notwithstanding the DTA, he had the power to continue to order
interrogations that included torture.  As professor Martin Lederman put 
it “[t]ranslation: I reserve the constitutional right to waterboard when it 
will ‘assist’ in protecting the American people from terrorist attacks.”194 
Thus, even though the DTA claimed to prohibit torture and cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment, the President claimed the right to 
continue the practice.
VIII. THE SUPREME COURT REASSERTS ITSELF:
HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD195 
The jurisdiction stripping provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 were aimed directly at Rasul’s holding that detainees at Guantanamo
Bay were entitled to statutory habeas review.  In a complex and narrow 
opinion, a bare majority in Hamdan concluded that the DTA applied
prospectively. Thus, all of the detainees at Guantanamo as of the 
effective date of the DTA could still maintain petitions for writs of 
habeas corpus. The Court also held that the procedures set forth in the 
DTA violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which had incorporated
the laws of war and thus incorporated the Geneva Conventions into 
domestic law. This meant that Common Article Three, with its 
proscription of torture and cruel, degrading, and inhumane treatment, 
applied to the detainees, and that a federal habeas court could inquire 
into both their continued detention and their treatment. 
However, the Court avoided the two major questions.  First, does 
constitutional habeas apply to Guantanamo’s detainees (as opposed to 
statutory habeas which Congress can change)? Second, Hamdan left 
open the question of whether the Geneva Conventions are self-executing.
Do the Geneva Conventions apply to the detainees irrespective of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (which Congress can also change)? 
Justice Bryer’s concurring opinion (joined by Justices Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Kennedy) practically invited a legislative response. 
The dissenters say that today’s decision would ‘sorely hamper the President’s ability
to confront and defeat a deadly enemy.’ They suggest that it undermines our 
Nation’s ability to ‘preven[t] future attacks’ of the grievous sort that we have 
already suffered.  That claim leads me to state briefly what I believe the majority
sets forth both explicitly and implicitly at greater length. The Court’s conclusion
ultimately rests on a single ground: Congress has not issued the Executive a 
194. Professor Lederman is a regular commentator on Jack Balkin’s Blog. So Much 
for the President’s Assent to the McCain Amendment, posting by Marty Lederman to 
Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/01/so-much-for-presidents-assent-to.html (Jan.
2, 2006, 11:21 EST). 
195. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
106
CLARKE FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2009 9:27 AM     
 
   
 
   














   
 
  
   
  
 
   
 
   
    
  
[VOL. 11:  59, 2009] De-cloaking Torture 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
‘blank check.’  Indeed, Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to
create military commissions of the kind at issue here.  Nothing prevents the 
President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary. 
(citations omitted).196 
Justice Kennedy, however, also concurring, hinted that even with 
appropriate legislation, the President’s powers might not be unlimited. 
He wrote, “[i]f Congress, after due consideration, deems it appropriate to
change the controlling statutes, in conformance with the Constitution 
and other laws, it has the power and prerogative to do so”197 (emphasis 
added). Thus, Justice Kennedy hinted that even if the Congress and the
President agree, the Constitution could impose limitations.198  Justices
Souter, Breyer and Ginsberg joined Kennedy’s opinion. It is this 
tantalizing hint that made Hamdan so important—the legislature might 
not be completely free to write the president a blank check. 
IX. HOW THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT CLOAKED TORTURE
The Congress responded to Hamdan with the Military Commissions
Act of 2006, which attempted to again cut off all civilian court review 
for Guantanamo detainees.  As one scholar put it, “[w]ith the adoption of 
the DTA and MCA, Congress has now given the President virtually all 
that he sought with respect to detention and trial of enemy 
combatants.”199  If upheld, these two pieces of legislation would have
returned detainees to roughly their original position. 
Before Boumediene there was vigorous debate on whether the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 could withstand constitutional scrutiny.200 
196. Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 637 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
198. See, Peter E. Quint, Silences and Peculiarities of the Hamdan Opinions, 66
MD. L. REV. 772, 784–86 (2007) (for a fuller analysis of what Justice Kennedy might have
meant).
199. Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Different War: Ten Key Questions About the War on
Terror, 75 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (2007). 
200. Curtis A. Bradley argued, for example, that while the jurisdiction stripping part
of the MCA will likely be held not to suspend the constitutional writ of habeas corpus, 
but that the CSRTs can, with appropriate appellate oversight provide an acceptable 
substitute for the Great Writ.  Bradley, supra note 174, at 334. Carlos Manuel Vásquez 
disagreed, arguing that Congress lacked the power to interpret the Geneva Conventions and
the Court may find that the Geneva Conventions are self-executing and cannot be “unexecuted 
by Congress” and require more rights than the CSRTs and the MCA provide. Vásquez,
supra note 174, at 73.  Michael Greenberger interpreted Justice Kennedy’s crucial swing
vote as possibly voting to allow habeas corpus to apply to detainees and says on this 
issue that “[w]hat is clear, then, is that neither Hamdan nor the MCA provides the final 
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There will undoubtedly be continued debate about whether Boumediene
was correctly decided.  However, the burden of this Article is simply to 
show that one consequence of the MCA, should military commissions 
resume under it without significant modification, would be to continue 
to hide torture as well as other coercive and harsh interrogation 
techniques (and that Boumediene undermines that effect). 
We turn to seemingly narrow evidentiary issues which, it will be
argued, paved the way for hiding torture: the use of secret evidence from 
which the detainee and his lawyer are excluded, hearsay evidence, 
including hearsay within hearsay, use of evidence stemming from coercive 
interrogation techniques, use of non-testimonial evidence stemming
from torture—including the use of such to validate or render reliable 
statements obtained through coercion. 
Furthermore, both the CSRTs and the military commissions, staffed
completely by the military, became so politicized that the chief 
prosecutor Colonel Morris Davis resigned, complaining about “political
interference with the independence of his office.”201 Under these 
circumstances, it is reasonable to ask how independent these tribunals 
could ever be and how likely they would be to exercise discretion in 
favor of a detainee.202 
A. Interplay Between the Rules of Evidence: A Subtle
Way to Hide Torture 
Rule 304 of the Military Commission Rules of Evidence, taken
directly from Section 948r of the MCA, comprehensively deals with
confessions, admissions, and other statements.  On its face it appears to
rule out statements obtained by torture.  A statement obtained through 
the use of coercion not rising to the level of torture is admissible if it was
taken before December 30, 2005, (the effective date of the Detainee 
Treatment Act) if it is deemed “reliable and possessing sufficient 
thoughts on the treatment of detainees in the war on terror, and it is the Court, not Congress,
that will likely have the last word.”  Michael Greenberg, You Ain’t Seen Nothin’ Yet: The
Inevitable Post-Hamdan Conflict Between the Supreme Court and the Political Branches, 66 
MD. L. REV. 805, 834 (2007). 
201. Marc Falkkoff wrote, “In September of this year, Davis [the military prosecutor]
threatened to resign if anyone tried to intimidate him. He has now done so, stating bluntly
that, ‘as things stand right now, I think it’s a disgrace to call it a military commission—
it’s a political commission.’” Politics at Guantanamo: The Former Chief Prosecutor
Speaks, JURIST, Nov. 2, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/11/politics-at-guantanamo- 
former-chief.php. 
202. Amnesty International et al. supra note 178. 
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probative value,” and if “the interests of justice” are “best served” by its 
admission.203 
The line between coercion and torture can cut exceedingly fine. For
example, in the case of Salim Ahmed Hamdan (Osama bin Laden’s
alleged driver), military defense lawyers alleged that Hamdan’s
interrogation included beatings, sexual humiliation, a forced walk in 
stooped “duck walk” (detainees often also had hands tied behind their
back), guards ramming his head into roadside posts repeatedly, each
time announcing “again,” denial of medical care for a painful back
injury, being touched inappropriately by a female interrogator, and being 
held for long periods in solitary confinement.204  Plainly, some things
such as denial of pain medications can, without more, constitute torture. 
Moreover, the sum total of this kind of treatment, if found credible, is 
most certainly torture.  Military prosecutors declined comment. 
Finally, after years of detention and mistreatment, (and most importantly,
after the Supreme Court had decided Boumediene) Hamdan faced a
military commission.  The military judge in that commission had ruled 
that Hamdan was not entitled to protections under the Fifth Amendment 
to the Constitution, but barred evidence immediately following his capture.
However, the ruling allowed the introduction of Hamdan’s statements 
made while a prisoner at Guantanamo Bay.  This included coercive
interrogations that apparently did not amount to torture.205 
Prosecutors, who had sought a thirty year sentence, were plainly
disappointed in the verdict, which found Hamdan guilty of providing
material support for terrorism, and sentenced him to only five and a half 
years in prison with credit for time served.  This meant that Hamdan 
could be released within 6 months.206  Prosecutors sought to extend his
sentence by arguing that the military commission jury improperly gave 
203. Military Comm’n R. Evid. 304, supra note 6.
204. William Glaberson, A Legal Filing Alleges a Detainee Was Abused, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 2008, at A11. 
205. According to the ruling (para. 43) coercive practices apparently included
touching his crotch by a female interrogator, solitary confinement, possible withholding of
medical care for short periods, and being force fed to end his hunger strike.  United States v.
Hamdan, ruling on Motion To Suppress Statements Based On Coercive Interrogation 
Practices, July 20, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Ruling%20on%20Motion%20to%20
Suppress%2029%20and%20D-044%20Ruling%201%20(2).pdf. 
206. Devin Montgomery, Hamdan Sentence Could Mean Fewer Than Six Months in 
Prison, JURIST, Aug. 7, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/08/hamdan-sentence 
-could-mean-fewer-than.php. 
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him credit for time served.207  Finally, the government, facing up to
defeat, arranged to send Hamdan to Yemen before the end of his
sentence.208 
Hamdan’s case might superficially seem to argue that the military
commissions worked, albeit slowly, to provide justice.  After all, the 
administration and prosecutors were unhappy with the result.  This,
however, would be a misreading of this case.
First, this case was tried after the Supreme Court decided Boumediene. 
That case changed the military’s calculus by making it much harder for 
torture to be hidden. One can only speculate about how Hamdan’s
military commission might have turned out had Boumediene not been
decided in the way that it was.  It clearly could have been much different.
Second, the military judge only barred evidence stemming from the 
worst mistreatment.  He did not bar subsequent evidence that appears to
have been coerced. Even this ignores the flow-over effect from the
original mistreatment.  It is difficult to see how the later coerced statements
could be free of taint from the earlier torture-induced evidence.  The
fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine did not apply in Hamdan’s military
commission. 
Finally, as we will demonstrate, the rules of the military commissions
permit the hiding of evidence directly stemming from torture.  The fact 
that excesses were discovered and partially dealt with in this one case
does not show that torture would be discovered or dealt with in other 
cases.  Most importantly, it does not show what would have happened 
had Boumediene not been decided as it was.
Moreover, as we show more fully below, Hamdan’s lawyers were
operating under disabilities that no defense lawyer ought ever to face. 
Given the obstacles noted below, it seems to be a miracle that he 
received the short sentence that he did.  Apparently the military commission 
jury simply did not believe that Hamdan was as complicit in terrorist
activities as the prosecution tried to make out. 
Rule 304 only limits the use of statements obtained using torture. 
Moreover, under the Military Commissions Act, the President has the 
unilateral and unreviewable power to establish interrogation methods.209 
207. Devin Montgomery, U.S. Seeking Extended Sentence for Guantanamo Detainee
Hamdan, JURIST, Oct. 20, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/10/us-seeking-
extended-sentence-for.php. 
208. Josh White & William Branigin, Hamdan to be Sent to Yemen; Bin Laden Driver 
Spent 7 Years at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2008, A1. 
209. According to Department of Justice spokesmen, the government could resort to
waterboarding or other harsh techniques if the following guidelines are met: 
1. the CIA and the Director of National Intelligence would have to determine
new method necessary in the war on terror; 
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If the President formally, by published executive order, says a practice is
lawful, then it cannot by definition be torture.  Thus, by specifying what 
practices are lawful, the president could, by negative inference, 
effectively define what constitutes torture.  The MCA also gives the 
President the power “to interpret the meaning and application of the
Geneva Conventions.210  This provision, had it been sustained, further 
would have constrained the use of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions as predicates for a prosecution under the War Crimes Act.
If the President says that a practice does not violate the Geneva
Conventions it would, by that declaration, become lawful and presumably
unreviewable by the courts.  Thus, Congress, in passing the MCA not 
only attempted an end-run on the courts, but also on the Geneva 
Conventions and the Convention Against Torture.211 
Moreover, while eliminating torture-derived statements, as we saw
with Hamdan’s military commission, the act does not limit derivative 
uses; there is no “fruit of the poisonous tree” prohibition.212  This  rule  
must be read in tandem with the rules providing for hearsay evidence,
and the rules providing for ex parte and in camera proceedings where
classified information is used. 
Rule 803 allows the admission of hearsay that would otherwise be 
inadmissible in a civilian court so long as the proponent has given notice 
to his adversary, or absent notice, the adversary has had a “fair opportunity 
under the totality of the circumstances” to contest it.  The only limitation
on hearsay occurs under the MCA if the opponent can demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the proposed hearsay is unreliable. 
Only then will the judge exclude the evidence.  A detainee at Guantanamo
Bay must have in hand, or be able to acquire, a preponderance of evidence 
2. the Attorney General would have to conclude use of the method would be 
lawful (including DTA and MCA and Common Art. 3); 
3. the President would have to personally authorize the technique; and 
4. in the case of waterboarding, Congress and relevant committees would 
have to be notified. 
Brett Murphy, Waterboarding Not Authorized Under Current Law: DOJ to House Panel,
JURIST, Feb. 14, 2008, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/02/waterboarding-not-
authorized-under.php.
210. Military Commissions Act of 2006 Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a)(3), 120 Stat. 
2600, 2632. 
211. This article addresses Boumediene’s probable effect on these issues.  See infra
Part X. 
212. Farer, supra note 183, at 370–71. 
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that his hearsay accuser is unreliable.  We explore that possibility in 
more detail below. 
Finally, there is the interplay with Rule 505 which privileges classified
information and allows for ex parte submissions as well as submissions 
in camera.  While the detainee and his counsel will receive summaries,
we have already seen from the CSRT proceedings that the information 
received may be meaningless and unhelpful to the defense.  The example 
of Canadian Omar Khadr demonstrates the unfairness of this procedure
and can help develop an understanding of how secrecy in the
proceedings can obscure torture.  On October 15, 2007, the military 
judge in Khadr’s case entered a protective order prohibiting defense 
counsel from disclosing the names of any of the government’s witnesses
to Khadr or any other witness in the case.213  Thus, defense counsel 
cannot discuss the names of witnesses with either the client or other 
witnesses unless they first get permission from the judge, which in turn 
shifts the burden to the defense and also results in its having to disclose 
trial strategy. 
This raises a fundamental problem.  How will counsel even know to 
ask for relief from the protective order?  Often counsel finds things out 
only after she has discussed the matter fully with witnesses. A
discussion with one witness leads to questions for another, and so on. 
Leads are often discovered serendipitously.  One does not know what 
one does not know.  This will hamstring counsel in ways she can only
guess at; she may never know the questions to ask. 
It also results in a potentially catastrophic dilemma for defense 
counsel. Suppose defense counsel believes that a witness may have 
knowledge of exculpatory evidence.  She will undoubtedly wish to 
discuss the possibility with her client (or other witnesses or potential
witnesses) before pursuing the matter.  Suppose that she goes to the
judge and receives permission to discuss the matter.  If the lead does not
work out, the defense will not be able to produce any evidence.  In most
ordinary cases before civilian courts, neither the opponent nor the judge
would know that the lawyer had followed a blind lead.  Here, however, 
the judge and presumably the prosecutor will know that defense counsel
sought and failed to find exculpatory evidence.  Not only is trial strategy
disclosed, but an adverse inference may be created where none existed
before. To the extent that this dilemma prevents defense counsel from 
properly investigating her case, it also interferes with any possibility of 
the public learning anything useful about the proceedings.  Furthermore,
213. Protective Order #003 Protection of Identities of Witnesses, in United States v. 
Khadr, Oct. 15, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/gazette/2007/12/khadr-military-commission- 
trial-witness.php.
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one can only imagine the difficulty in preparing for cross-examination 
when defense counsel cannot use the witnesses’ names in order to make 
inquiries.
Defense counsel’s problems, however, get worse.  Even when she knows
who the witnesses are, she not only cannot discuss them with her client
or other witnesses, but she may not even be able to even talk with the
witnesses at all.  In the case of detainee Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the U.S.
military judge, citing security concerns, ruled that his lawyers could not 
meet with certain other suspects held at Guantanamo Bay.214  His  
lawyers were, however, permitted to send written questions, which had 
to be reviewed by an independent security officer, to Khalid Sheik
Mohammed and other detainees.215  Thus, defense counsel in Hamdan’s
case could not discuss witnesses with the detainee, could not discuss
witnesses’ statements with other witnesses, and in some cases could not
even conduct face-to-face interviews.  This is trial by ambush. 
B. A Hypothetical Case Study of What Might Have           
Been But for Boumediene
Let us imagine a hypothetical detainee named John Smith who made 
an incriminating statement prior to December 30, 2005,216 which the
judge has determined was coerced but not the product of torture.  (Of 
course, given the present rules, Smith may well have been waterboarded, 
or subjected to other treatment that some might regard as being the 
product of torture,217 but we leave that issue aside for the moment). The
214. According to the report, “[l]awyers had hoped that the suspects, including alleged
Sept. 11 architect Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, would be allowed to testify that Hamdan 
was not a devoted member of al-Qaeda and should not be tried as an enemy combatant 
under the U.S. military tribunal system.”  Mike Rosen-Molina, U.S. Military Judge Denies 
Hamdan Lawyers Access to Top Terror Suspects, JURIST, Dec. 5, 2007, http://jurist.law.
pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/12/us-military-judge-blocks-hamdan lawyers.php.
215. Patrick Porter, U.S. Military Judge Rules Hamdan Lawyers Can Question Top
Terror Suspects, JURIST, Feb. 15, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/02/us-
military-judge-rules-hamdan-lawyers.php.
216. The effective date of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 is the cutoff date for 
using “coerced” statements that have been determined reliable and probative.  Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(b), 119 Stat. 2741. 
217. Of course, it may be that one of the reasons why former Attorney General 
Mukasey would not admit that waterboarding is torture was in order to preserve it as 
potential evidence in these military commissions. It also may be that he needs to protect,
to the extent he can, those who authorized waterboarding from criminal prosecution 
under the War Crimes Act.  War Crimes Act of 1996, 118 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
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military judge must determine the reliability of that “coerced” statement, 
and determine whether the “interests of justice would best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence.”218  If the prosecution meets
both tests, the coerced statement will be received into evidence. 
Let us assume further that one John Rolfe, under questioning by 
Syrians, has said that Smith is associated with al-Qaeda.  Assuming
proper notice, this hearsay is admissible unless Smith can show it to be
unreliable. Smith, of course, has been in detention and will likely have 
no way on his own to prove that Rolfe’s statement is the product of
torture or is otherwise unreliable.  Assume further that the government 
has a report in which an unnamed agent, from an unnamed agency, states 
that he was present at Rolfe’s questioning and in his opinion his 
statements were neither involuntary or coerced, much less the product of 
torture. Does Rolfe’s statement come in through the unnamed agent? If 
so, how will Smith or his lawyer ever be able to test it in any way or 
meet the burden by a preponderance of the evidence to show it to be 
unreliable? 
Lest one think that the military would assist in finding evidence 
helpful to the detainee, we have the sad case of Hadj Boudella as 
precedent. Picked up and held for investigation by Bosnian officials and 
accused of plotting to blow up U.S. and U.K. embassies, the Bosnian 
Supreme Court ultimately released him because the charges could not be 
substantiated.219  Upon release in Bosnia, Boudella was rendered to
Guantanamo Bay.  Three years later he was taken before a Combatant
Status Review Panel where he sought to introduce the Bosnian Supreme 
Court opinion.  The tribunal advised that they were “unable to locate” a
copy.220  Moreover, even where the government has evidence in hand, 
defense lawyers cannot get access.  Media reports221 suggest that secret 
218. Military Comm’n R. Evid. 304, supra note 6, at 304(c)(1). 
219. Boudella was picked up along with six others including Lakhdar Boumedine. 
According to BBC News, U.S. officials asked the Bosnian government to pick them up
on suspicion of plotting to bomb the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo.  The men were arrested, 
but a three-month investigation in which their apartments, computers and documents
were searched turned up no evidence.  The Bosnian Supreme Court ordered their release
and ruled that they could remain in the country and were not to be deported.  On January
17, 2002 they were kidnapped and rendered to Guantanamo. U.N. special rapporteur says
of the six that “It’s implausible to say that they were enemy combatants.  They were
fighters in the Bosnian war, but that ended in 1995.  They may be radical Islamists, but 
they have definitely not committed any crime.” U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said
that they could not be released because “they still possess[ed] important intelligence data.”
BBCNEWS,Dec. 4, 2007,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7120713.stm.
220. Farer, supra note 183, at 371, 377. 
221. Michael Melia, Secret Evidence Bogs Down Gitmo Hearings, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 9, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/09/AR200 
8020900498.html. 
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evidence is bogging down the commission hearings, and defense lawyers 
have complained that prosecutors continue to withhold exculpatory
evidence from the defense and the public.  Navy Lt. Cmdr. William 
Kuebler, military defense lawyer for Omar Khadr, says “There’s no
openness about this process.”222  In practice, detainees in MCA and 
CSRT223 proceedings are limited to whatever witnesses are available on 
Guantanamo Bay.224  The government, on the other hand, has unlimited
resources.
Unlike CSRT proceedings, the detainee will at least have a civilian 
lawyer available in military commission hearings who may have the 
resources to conduct some investigation.  If the history of the CSRTs is a 
guide, however, there is little reason to think that the military will go out 
of its way to find exculpatory evidence.  Indeed, it appears that the CIA,
over the objections of others in government,225 has already destroyed 
evidence of officially sanctioned torture.  The New York Times reported 
on December 7, 2007 that the CIA has destroyed the videotapes of at
least two interrogations, leading to fears that the agency was covering up 
evidence that it used torture in its interrogations.226  Then, on March 2,
222. Id.
223. “In 102 CSRTs, the government did not present a single witness against a single
detainee.  Every request to call an un-detained defense witness was denied.  Seventy- four
percent of requests to call a detained defense witness were denied. In 96% of the CSRTs,
the government did not present any documentary evidence to the detainee prior to the 
hearing. In 89% of the tribunals, absolutely no evidence was presented on behalf of the 
detainee.”  Amnesty International et al. supra note 178, citing Mark Denbeaux et al., No
Hearing Hearings, CSRT: The Modern Habeas Corpus?, Seton Hall University School of
Law, at http://law.shu.edu/news/final_no_hearing_hearings_report.pdf (last visited Dec. 5,
2007).
224. See for example JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2006); MICHAEL RATNER, GUANTANAMO: WHAT THE WORLD
SHOULD KNOW (2004), for accounts of the obstacles faced by lawyers for detainees. 
225. Mark Mazzeti, C.I.A. Was Urged to Keep Interrogation Videotapes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 8, 2007 at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/08/washington/08intel.
html?_r=1&hp&oref=login. 
226. The C.I.A. destroyed tapes of interrogations of two al-Qaeda operatives in the 
agency’s custody.  The official reasons given were to protect the agents’ safety and because 
the tapes were no longer of use.  Despite a formal request these tapes were not provided
the 9/11 Commission thus leading to charges that the C.I.A. might have obstructed 
justice. Human rights groups have charged that the destruction was in order to cover up 
torture.  Tom Malinowski, Washington director of Human Rights Watch disputes the official 
reasoning saying that “[m]illions of documents in C.I.A. archives, if leaked, would
identify C.I.A. officers, the only difference here is that these tapes portray potentially
criminal activity.  They must have understood that if people saw these tapes, they would
consider them to show acts of torture, which is a felony offense.”  Mark Mazzetti, C.I.A. 
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2009, the Department of Justice disclosed that the CIA had destroyed 
ninety-two videotapes of interrogations of suspected terrorists.227 
Twelve of these tapes apparently involved enhanced or harsh
interrogation techniques.228 Not only did the 9/11 Commission request
this information,229 but the Center for Constitutional Rights also sought
this information under the Freedom of Information Act.  The Center
claimed (even before the latest revelation concerning the ninety-two 
tapes) that the CIA “blatantly lied during pending litigation.”230  This  
raises the question, “will anybody—lawyers for detainees or human rights 
activists or congressional investigators or even just bloody-minded 
opponents of the Bush administration—be able to make a case that the 
CIA, by destroying the tapes, was destroying evidence?”231 
Moreover, prior to President Obama’s suspension of the military 
commissions232 the government was going back and re-interrogating
detainees at Guantanamo Bay with so-called “clean teams” in order to
try to clean up the mess created by the use of illegal interrogation 
methods.233  The idea was to go back to detainees who had provided
information under torture and to get the information without the use of 
torture. Then the government could claim that the evidence was obtained
humanely.  Smith’s accusers can thus include the hearsay evidence of
persons who have been tortured in the past, but who later re-confirmed
their accusations in “clean” confessionals.  Thus torture evidence may be
sanitized and then introduced as reliable hearsay.  Smith and counsel
may never know and may never be able to attack the foundations of this 
hearsay evidence. 
Destroyed 2 Tapes Showing Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at A1, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/washington/07intel.html?hp. 
227. Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Says C.I.A. Destroyed 92 Tapes of Interrogations, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at A16 (videos of terror suspects depicted harsh methods used to
question ‘high value’ Al Qaeda suspects). 
228. Devlin Barrett, CIA Destroyed 12 Harsh Interrogation Tapes, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Mar. 7, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=7028547. 
229. CIA Destroyed Interrogation Tapes, BBCNEWS, Dec. 7, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/americas/7133579.stm. 
230. Adam Brooke, CIA Chief Faces Credibility Test, BBC NEWS, Dec. 7, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7133579.stm.
231. Id.
232. Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval 
Base and Closure of the Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897,
4899 (Jan. 22, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/gitmo_final exec
_order.pdf. 
233. Marjorie Cohn, Op-Ed., Injustice at Guantanamo: Torture Evidence and the 
Military Commissions Act, JURIST, Feb. 15, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2008/02/
injustice-at-guantanamo-torture.php. 
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Smith and his lawyer will have to collect such rebuttal evidence as 
they can without help from the government.  Indeed, given what has in
fact happened, the inference drawn must be that the government will 
actively resist providing helpful evidence and that it may even destroy or 
secretly sanitize evidence.
Under the MCA the evidence against Smith could get worse.  Suppose 
an unnamed terrorist was tortured, perhaps in Egypt.  Suppose further, 
he says that Smith is a terrorist.  That statement, of course, is inadmissible.
Suppose, in addition to a statement, he tells about a safe deposit box that
agents then search only to find a shard of paper with Smith’s name and
telephone number on it.  It does not matter that it was torture-derived 
evidence. Since it is not itself a statement, it may come into evidence to 
demonstrate the reliability of Smith’s “coerced” statement.  It also does 
not matter that the sources and methods of collecting this document are 
classified and never made known to Smith or even his counsel.  It also is
of little significance that the evidence so seized is ambiguous.234  Smith 
can argue, if he wishes, that many people had his telephone number 
precisely because they may need his lawful services.  The evidence
enhances the reliability of the coerced statement and may come into
evidence. The point here is that evidence can be obtained through 
torture that is obscured through the lens of hearsay evidence. This is in 
part because the hearsay evidence may itself come from a classified and 
unnamed source, whose credibility and accuracy cannot be tested in any 
way.  Moreover, even where torture can be proved, evidence derived
therefrom may still be admissible so long as the statement is not itself 
used. 
Smith can be “convicted” on a coerced statement that is deemed
reliable because of hearsay that supports the coerced statement, because 
of secret evidence that Smith will never see (and his lawyer cannot
discuss with him to find out if there is any rebuttal evidence), and even
because of evidence unquestionably derived from torture.  So, what 
about the nature of Smith’s “coerced” statement?  What might that
coercion look like?  Might it look to some as if it came from torture?
234. This is not as far-fetched as one might think.  The evidence against Abdul Hamid
al-Ghizzawi, included “a tiny square of paper” containing the telephone number of another
detainee, allegedly found in al-Ghizzawi’s pocket and for which he could “offer ‘no
explanation.’” Apparently no one had ever asked al-Ghizzawi for an explanation, and 
because of chain of custody problems it is not even certain that the shard of paper was
actually in his pocket.  Suskind, supra note 184, at 224–25. 
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The case of Al Qahtani, whose interrogation the Pentagon defended,235 
provides a window on at least some of the military’s thinking.  Time 
Magazine broke the story and in a later article summarized his
treatment:236  “U.S. interrogators [used] a wide range of tactics to get 
him to talk, including sleep deprivation, exposure to cold, forced
standing, denial of bathroom breaks, denial of clothing and all manner of 
emotional manipulations.”  After “more than three months of ‘intense
isolation’ Al Qahtani ‘was evidencing behavior consistent with extreme 
psychological trauma (talking to non-existent people, reporting hearing 
voices, crouching in a cell covered with a sheet for hours on end).’”237 
That was before the military began to really bear down.  According to 
the military’s own logs, as reported by Time,238 Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld approved stress strategies like standing for prolonged 
periods, isolation for as long as 30 days, removal of clothing, forced 
shaving of facial hair, playing on ‘individual phobias” (such as dogs) 
and ‘mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the
chest with the finger and light pushing.’  At one point Al Qahtani’s
condition deteriorated to the point where he became seriously dehydrated
and was given an IV drip.  According to Time, Al Qahtani’s heart dropped 
to 35 beats a minute and he was hospitalized.  The article goes on to
point out the FBI’s concerns over the “highly aggressive interrogation 
techniques” used on Al Qahtani.  While it is true that charges were brought 
then later dropped239 against Al Qahtani, it was without prejudice and
subject to reinstatement should military commissions ever regain their 
footing.240  Moreover, his indefinite detention as an alleged enemy 
combatant remained unchanged.  The military initially denied that al-
Qahtani was tortured claiming that no physical pain was involved.241 
However, Susan J. Crawford, the convening authority, has publicly said 
that the reason she refused to allow the prosecution to go forward was
235. Joseph Margulies, who represented detainees at Guantanamo Bay, writes “the
Pentagon defended the professionalism of Al Qahtani’s interrogators.”  MARGULIES, supra
note 177, at 88. 
236. Adam Zagorin, One Life Inside Gitmo, TIME, Mar. 13, 2006, at 20. 
237. MARGULIES, supra note 177, at 86. 
238. Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, Inside the Interrogation of Detainee 063, 
TIME, June 20, 2005 26, 28–33. 
239. His lawyer alleges that al-Qahtani was so upset at the charges, which carried a 
potential death penalty that before the charges had been dropped, he attempted suicide. 
Mike Rosen-Molina, Guantanamo Detainee Attempted Suicide over DOD Charges Later
Dropped: Lawyer, JURIST, May 20, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/05/
guantanamo-detainee-attempted-suicide.php. 
240. Andrew Gilmore, U.S. military drops charges against so-called ‘20th Hijacker’, 
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because, in her assessment, he had been tortured.242 Our knowledge of
al-Qahtani’s mistreatment was entirely fortuitous.  One might reasonably 
ask what might have happened had the evidence of his treatment not 
somehow publicly surfaced.  Thus, even as Al Qahtani’s case shows the
kind of torture that some detainees faced, it also demonstrates the
fortuity of discovery.  Plainly, the Bush administration proved unable to
hide all evidence of torture. Just as plainly, they scrambled to hide as
much as they could. 
In our hypothetical, Smith’s “coerced” statement in this instance may
appear to be indistinguishable from one procured through torture. 
Whether we call it torture, or torture “lite,” or just coercion, it is no 
wonder in our hypothetical that Smith talked.  The question one ought to
ask is how reliable his statement really is, even if supported by other 
evidence lawfully before the military commission.  One ought also to 
ask, irrespective of reliability, whether the United States should be 
engaging in such practices.
Finally, there is the matter of Smith’s appellate rights.  Until Boumediene
reversed the MCA’s jurisdiction stripping provisions, the MCA divested
the federal district courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction. This is important
because a federal habeas court would be the only civilian court to have 
the power to make a factual record.  Thus, prior to Boumediene, detainee 
Smith would have had to rely on the record made by the CSRT or the
military commission operating under the rules described above for any 
appeal. This is the first and a critical obstacle to any appeal.  What kind 
of record does the appellant have to work with to generate the questions 
and arguments for an appeal?  One can reasonably ask whether Smith
will have any credible evidence on the record other than his own self-
serving testimony (no doubt contradicted by military witnesses, named
and unnamed) that torture played a role in the evidence before the court. 
Beyond that hurdle, the rules on the appeal (absent a writ of habeas
corpus) were not promising from Smith’s perspective.  The first level 
appeal would have been to a Court of Military Commission Review and
then to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.243  The
Court of Military Commission Review was then limited to acting “only
 242. Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 
2009, at A1. 
243. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has ruled in Bismullah v. 
Gates, that as a result of Boumediene it lacks jurisdiction to hear detainees appeals under
the DTA. Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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with respect to matters of law.”  How likely is it that they will discover 
and reverse a discretionary evidentiary ruling that has the effect of 
obscuring or hiding torture?  The appeal to the Court of Appeals is
similarly limited to whether the military commission followed its own
“standards and procedures” and “to the extent applicable, the
Constitution and the laws of the United States.”244  Clearly Congress, 
from its use of the language “to the extent applicable,” sought to leave 
open the government’s argument that a detainee at Guantanamo Bay has 
no constitutional rights.245  In any event, Congress plainly sought to limit
the appeal to the narrowest possible scope.  It seems unlikely that this 
limited appeal will discover, much less disclose, evidence of any torture. 
The only bright spot in all of this is that the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia held firm to the demand that the Pentagon 
supply all evidence pertaining to an “enemy combatant” and not just the 
evidence that the Pentagon selects to present to the court.246  This left  
open the possibility that the appeals court might discover and act upon 
exculpatory evidence not presented to the CSRT or military commission.247 
However, appellate courts are ill equipped to perform the role of 
advocate, and one should not expect judges (or even their clerks) to
perform the kind of searching inquiry that skilled counsel would ordinarily 
provide. Moreover, the CSRT appellate process left no room for use of 
after-discovered evidence of innocence (no matter how compelling).248 
One could be conclusively discovered to have been consorting with
penguins in the Antarctic at the time of the alleged crime and it would 
not matter; there would be no power to rectify the mistake other than to 
244. 10 U.S.C. § 950(g) (2006) (Military Commissions Act). 
245. Boumediene rejected that position. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2229. 
246. Patrick Porter, Federal Appeals Court Refuses to Reconsider ‘Enemy Combatant’ 
Evidence Ruling, JURIST, Feb. 1, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/02/fed 
Peral-appeals-court-refuses-to.php.
247. The government filed a petition for writ of certiorari in Gates v. Bismullah and 
has requested expedited review and a stay pending the Supreme Court ruling.  Jaime Jansen, 
U.S. Government Appeals ‘Enemy Combatant’ Evidence Ruling to Supreme Court, 
JURIST, Feb. 15, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/02/us-government-appeals-
enemy-combatant.php (Boumediene presumably obviates that petition). 
248. By foreclosing consideration of evidence not presented or reasonably available 
to the detainee at the CSRT proceedings, the DTA disadvantages the detainee by limiting 
the scope of collateral review to a record that may not be accurate or complete.
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2273.  In other contexts, e.g., in post-trial habeas cases where 
the prisoner already has had a full and fair opportunity to develop the factual predicate of
his claims, similar limitations on the scope of habeas review may be appropriate.  See, 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436–37 (2000) (noting that section 2254 “does not
equate prisoners who exercise diligence in pursuing their claims with those who do not”). In
this context, however, where the underlying detention proceedings lack the necessary
adversarial character, the detainee cannot be held responsible for all deficiencies in the 
record.
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appeal to the unreviewable discretion of the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense to convene a new CSRT.249 
Let us assume, against all odds, that the military commission acquitted 
Smith.  As we have already seen, the administration prior to Boumediene
claimed the right to hold him indefinitely and potentially for the rest of 
his life.250  Even if he were, by any reasonable definition of the term,
tortured, would he be free and able to tell his story?  He certainly would 
not be able to tell about torture or coercion-derived evidence of which
neither he nor his lawyers ever knew.  Who would tell Smith’s story?
Who would know? How would anyone, absent an Article III habeas 
court, begin to piece it together?
X. BOUMEDIENE CHANGES THE CALCULUS
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Boumediene features a
modestly limited holding, purporting to invalidate a single subsection of
one law—the habeas jurisdiction stripping portions of the MCA: 
Our decision today holds only that the petitioners before us are entitled to seek
the writ; that the DTA review procedures are an inadequate substitute for habeas
corpus; and that the petitioners in these cases need not exhaust the review
procedures in the Court of Appeals before proceeding with their habeas actions 
in the District Court. The only law we identify as unconstitutional is MCA § 7, 
28 U.S.C. A. § 2241(e) (Supp. 2007). Accordingly, both the DTA and the CSRT 
process remain intact.251 
However, the ramifications of providing the Great Writ to alien detainees 
held outside U.S. territory reaches far more than this unassuming claim 
suggests. Not only does independent review by civilian courts give 
detainees a better (and quicker) opportunity for release, it also creates a 
greater likelihood of forcing disclosure of torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment (CIDs).  Moreover, it undermines the authority
granted the President to make unreviewable legal determinations about 
the legal scope of the Geneva Conventions, the War Crimes Act, and 
through it, the Convention Against Torture.  It adds to the pressure to 
close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay.  Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, by bringing the U.S. closer to compliance with




Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2271. 
See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2238. 
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275 (emphasis added). 
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of criticism directed at the United States internationally.252  The facts of 
the case derive from the executive and legislative reactions to the
Hamdi, Rasul, and Hamdan cases described above. 
In Boumediene, non-citizen aliens captured abroad in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere in the war on terror had been detained for up to six years 
(since 2002) as enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay.  Recall that the 
Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld held that alleged enemy combatants were
entitled to minimum due process requirements and thereafter the DOJ 
created Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) in order to comply
with this holding.253  All detainees then held by the DOJ were thereafter 
designated enemy combatants under these newly created CSRTs.  None 
had review applications heard on the merits, each denies that he is a
member of Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, and none are citizens of a nation at 
war with the U.S. 
Each detainee sought habeas corpus, and the Supreme Court in Rasul 
v. Bush held that the statutory writ of habeas corpus applied to detainees 
at Guantanamo Bay and that they were covered by the Geneva
Conventions.254 Their cases went back to the District Courts, which 
reached inconsistent results as to whether detainees had rights that could
be vindicated in a habeas action. 
While appeals were pending, Congress passed the DTA of 2005 that 
stripped courts of habeas jurisdiction.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld held that the 
DTA applied prospectively only, and that the detainees at Guantanamo
Bay could still avail themselves of the writ. Congress then passed the 
MCA of 2006, which, among other things, plainly attempted to strip the 
courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction retrospectively.255  The D.C. Court  
of Appeals confirmed that the MCA stripped constitutional habeas 
jurisdiction from the courts and further held that petitioners are not 
252. A major international poll conducted by the Pew Research Center
showed deepened Anti-American sentiments, particularly in Europe and the Muslim
world. Meg Bortin, Global Poll Shows Wide Distrust of the United States, INT’L HERALD
TRIBUNE, June 27, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/27/news/pew.php?page=1.  
On the other hand, a more recent poll states that “[a]fter years of becoming progressively
more negative, public views of the United States have begun to improve.”  Steven Kull, 
said of the poll, “[i]t may be that as the U.S. approaches a new presidential election,
views of the U.S. are mitigated by hope that a new administration will move away from
foreign policies that have been so unpopular in the world.”  Steven Kull, Global Views of
USA Improve, BBC News, Apr. 2, 2008, http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbccntry
view08/.
253. Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
254. Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
255. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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entitled to protections of the Constitution’s Suspension Clause.256 
Because it found habeas jurisdiction lacking, the Court of Appeals found 
it unnecessary to consider whether the DTA provided an adequate and
effective substitute for habeas.
The detainees faced three main hurdles in appealing to the U.S.
Supreme Court (albeit with various sub-issues).  First, (and most
importantly) does the Constitutional writ of habeas corpus apply to 
aliens captured abroad and held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, an area
where the U.S. does not have de jure sovereignty but exercises de facto
sovereignty?  On this the Court reversed the lower court, holding that
constitutional habeas corpus applies to the detainees at Guantanamo.  It
reasoned that the MCA does not purport to suspend the writ, and the
protections of the Suspension Clause do operate on non-citizens 
captured abroad and detained as enemy combatants in a place where the
U.S. lacks formal sovereignty but has complete jurisdiction and control. 
Thus, the MCA acts as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.  It is
this narrow slice of the law that the Court struck down. 
However, merely holding that the constitutional writ of habeas corpus 
extends to detainees at Guantanamo does not, by itself, provide relief to 
the detainees.  Congress had passed, and the Administration had signed 
into law, alternative remedies.  Were they an adequate substitute remedy
for the writ of habeas corpus?  The Court answered no.  The majority 
found many deficiencies in the CSRT process, including the inability to
consider after-acquired evidence of innocence that led to the conclusion 
that the DTA is not an adequate substitute for habeas corpus. The 
majority said “the procedural protections afforded to the detainees in the 
CSRT hearings . . .fall well short of the procedures and adversarial 
mechanisms that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus review.”257 
Finally, do these prisoners have to exhaust their remedies before
seeking habeas corpus?  The Court held, no. These detainees have been 
held for as many as six years without meaningful hearings and “the costs 
of delay can no longer be borne by those who are held in custody. The 
detainees in these cases are entitled to a prompt habeas corpus
hearing.”258 
256. “[T]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”  U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
257. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2283. 
258. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275. 
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The implications of this decision are far-reaching.  They include the
following seven points, the last in the form of a remaining question:
A. Torture will be Harder to Hide 
As fleshed out above, the MCA Rules of Evidence permit (and 
perhaps encourage) hiding evidence that some interrogations used 
torture and other abusive techniques to gain evidence or confessions. 
The members of the former Bush administration can no longer be 
confident that the military commissions will be able to screen evidence 
of interrogations that use coercive methods or torture from public view. 
The political changes wrought by the presidential election only serve 
to accentuate this point.  No matter how the election might have turned 
out, Boumediene made hiding torture more difficult. The current 
administration cannot be justly criticized for actions that expose detainees to
the U.S. Court system because Boumediene made that inevitable in any
event. It is true that whoever won the presidential election would have 
some discretion, but Boumediene significantly narrowed that discretion
and constrains action by pushing in the direction of openness.
Habeas courts are far more likely than military commissions to hear 
allegations and to consider evidence that detainees were tortured, and 
such evidence is more likely to become a matter of public record.259 In 
any event, the Obama administration moved only one day after inauguration
to suspend the military commission system.260  It may be that the Obama 
administration will ultimately reopen military commissions, at least for a 
few “high value” detainees: first, evidence obtained through coercion 
will likely face significant hurdles in any federal district court and 
second, hearsay evidence may present a significant problem in these 
259. See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (2005);
vacated and dismissed, Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 
549 U.S. 1328 (2007) (much evidence came out through this case that might well have 
been hidden from the public but for the fact that the matter came before a civilian court 
rather than a military commission).
260. See, e.g., Merle D. Kellerhals Jr., Obama Asks for 120-Day Delay for Guantánamo
Trial System: Military judge Halts Detainee Proceedings, AMERICA.GOV, Jan. 21, 2009, 
http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2009/January/20090121153052dmslahrellek0.
3931238.html; Posting of John Nichols, Obama Acts “In the Interest of Justice” to Halt
Tribunals, to NATION, http://www.thenation.com/blogs/state_of_change/399981/obama_acts_
in_the_interest_of_justice_to_halt_tribunals?rel=emailNation (Jan. 21, 2009, 08:45); Jaclyn
Belczyk, Guantanamo Judges Grant Obama Motions to Suspend Military Commission
Proceedings, JURIST, Jan. 22, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/ 2009/01/military-
judges-grant-obamas-motion-to.php; Lucas Tanglen, Obama Directs Prosecutors to Seek 
Guantanamo Military Commissions Delay, JURIST, Jan. 21, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
paperchase/2009/01/obama-directs-prosecutors-to-put.php. 
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cases.261 Boumediene’s extension of the writ of habeas corpus to these 
detainees makes it unlikely that the military commissions, if reformed,
would operate in the same way as previously.  Thus, Boumediene will 
change how detainees’ trials or commissions will proceed, and it will 
give detainees access to federal courts through the writ of habeas corpus. 
While it is not clear from Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion just how 
far habeas courts can go, their procedures will undoubtedly be more
detainee friendly than was the case with CSRTs and military commissions 
under the Bush administration.  Justice Roberts’ protestations to the
contrary,262 there would be little reason to hold habeas hearings that 
were identical to the hearings and appeals they supplant.  The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia has since ruled that review of
Combatant Status Review Tribunals should proceed only under petitions 
for writs of habeas corpus and not under the DTA.  That court ruled that 
habeas corpus is the detainees’ sole remedy for being held erroneously 
as enemy combatants.263 Thus, unless the Supreme Court reverses, 
Justice Roberts’ prediction cannot hold.
The habeas cases thus far suggest that habeas will result in the release 
of some detainees who were being held pursuant to Combatant Status
Review Tribunals.264 Thus habeas courts already appear to provide a
more hospitable forum for detainees.  It also seems reasonable to assume
that they will be more open to allegations that a detainee’s evidence was
tainted by torture. Finally, habeas courts will publish at least parts of 
261. William Glabberson wrote in The New York Times that the administration is 
rethinking the issue and is moving towards reviving military commissions because of the 
problems of prosecution in federal district court arising from the brutal treatment of some 
detainees and from the hearsay evidence gathered by intelligence agencies.  Attorney
General Holder has said: “It may be difficult for some of those high-value detainees to be
tried in federal court.” William Glaberson, U.S. May Revive Guantánamo Military Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2009, at A1, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/02/us/politics/
02gitmo.html?em. 
262. Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, argues: 
How the detainees’ claims will be decided now that the DTA is gone is anybody’s
guess.  But the habeas process the Court mandates will most likely end up looking
a lot like the DTA system it replaces, as the district court judges shaping it will 
have to reconcile review of the prisoners’ detention with the undoubted need to 
protect the American people from the terrorist threat—precisely the challenge
Congress undertook in drafting the DTA. All that today’s opinion has done is 
shift responsibility for those sensitive foreign policy and national security
decisions from the elected branches to the Federal Judiciary.
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2280. 
263. Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068 (2009). 
264. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
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their opinions (even as they may redact sensitive or classified material). 
Thus, it will be easier for journalists, historians, legal scholars, and 
others to access and evaluate that evidence. Habeas courts cannot help
but to open up, speed up, and make more transparent a hitherto opaque, 
glacial process. 
Ironically, by improving the access to information on the past 
administration’s torture practices, Boumediene somewhat improves the
possibility of future prosecutions, domestic or international.  A caveat is
in order, however, for war crimes prosecutions will remain unlikely 
notwithstanding Boumediene. We have already pointed out that the 
MCA partially and retroactively insulates officials from domestic prosecution. 
President Obama’s disinclination to pursue war crimes prosecutions 
against former members of the Bush administration is likely motivated 
by further legal difficulties as well as political considerations.265  As  
argued earlier in the introduction, these sorts of prosecutions would be
very difficult, and it is unlikely that such prosecutions would
succeed.266  And as previously noted, this reasoning applies as well to
international prosecutions exercising universal jurisdiction. Thus, some
foreign court may well proceed at some point, but it remains
questionable whether they will result in substantive convictions.267 
The fact that the National Security Council in formal session, (with 
the then Attorney General present and agreeing that what they did was
lawful) and with the explicit approval of the President, micromanaged 
the details of the CIA’s “alternative interrogation techniques” right down 
to the amount and details of waterboarding, renders it politically unlikely
that anyone following such orders would be held to have followed a 
“manifestly unlawful” order.  Thus, while Boumediene makes exposure 
more likely than otherwise might have been the case, it does not 
automatically mean that there will be prosecutions of administration 
officials or government agents, much less successful prosecutions.268 
265. Even before Obama was inaugurated, his nominee for CIA Director, Leon
Panetta said that the Obama administration would not prosecute officials who used or
participated in harsh interrogations because, “[i]t was my opinion we just can’t operate if
people feel even if they are following the legal opinions of the Justice Department” they
could be in danger of prosecution.  Pamela Hess, Panetta: No Prosecution for CIA Interrogators, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 6, 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5 
iNqjrsQ96LSw38bHitcinzS QAWgD96684PO1.
266. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 32, at 1. 
267. Paust, supra note 33. 
268. “[I]t seems certain that those who designed, approved, and perpetrated the worst
abuses will not face any criminal charges. Whether disgrace suffices remains an open 
question.” Clarke, supra note 32, at 50. While many scholars such as Paust, Balkin and Horton
have argued for such prosecutions, they seem quite unlikely. Id. at 42–50. 
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The fate of civil lawsuits against those who ordered harsh interrogation 
techniques remains open and could potentially result in disclosure of
harsh interrogation techniques,269 notwithstanding the continued
assertion of the state secrets privilege by the present administration.270 
B. Release from Detention for Some Detainees 
Because a habeas court will not be bound by the MCA’s rules of
evidence and can create its own record, it will be easier for a detainee to
establish innocence and secure release. Moreover, the decision will 
likely spur the administration into finding some way to release those
whom it no longer considers dangerous.  Habeas courts are already 
releasing some detainees,271 and the new administration is scrambling to
try to find ways to deal with the rest.272 
C. Boumediene, Not the Election, Made Guantanamo’s          
Closure Inevitable 
Boumediene, not politics or the election, made the end of Guantanamo
Bay inevitable.  Even before the Obama administration decided to close 
the detention center at the Guantanamo Naval Base,273 it was clear that
whoever won the election would have to close the base.
Even former administration officials were saying shortly after Boumediene
had been decided that now the reason for its existence (that is, the 
creation of a law-free zone away from the jurisdiction of federal courts) 
has ended, it likely would be closed.  Charles “Cully” D. Stimson, who 
oversaw detainee affairs for the Pentagon until early 2007, said that the 
269. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Boumediene, a lawsuit against Bush administration officials for the alleged 
abuse of detainees.  Rasul v. Myers, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008). 
270. See supra Part IX.
271. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
272. Peter Finn, 4 Cases Illustrate Guantanamo Quandaries: Administration Must 
Decide Fate of Often-Flawed Proceedings, Often Dangerous Prisoners, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 16, 2009, at A1 (sixty detainees cleared for release by the Bush administration 
remain at the camp, while twenty-one more were facing military commissions with hearings
to come before federal habeas courts.  Some more will undoubtedly be prosecuted while 
the fate of others remains unclear). 
273. See, Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed, Reg. (Jan. 22, 2009) (required that 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions would apply to all detainees captured by
the U.S. in the war against terror, and ordered the closure of the base at Guantanamo Bay
within one year of the effective date of the executive order). 
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Bush administration has several options on Guantanamo—but that 
almost all of them end in the facility’s closure.  He said Bush could run 
out the clock and leave such decisions to the next president, or he could 
take the “bold move” of immediately ordering Guantanamo’s safe and
secure closure.  “The legal rationale underlying the establishment of 
Guantanamo has been eviscerated by this decision,” said Stimson, now 
at the Heritage Foundation. “The question is not if Guantanamo will 
close; it’s when.”274 
Before the election both presidential candidates advocated closing the 
Guantanamo detention facility.275 Boumediene thus made the order to
close the base much easier politically. The Wall Street Journal succinctly
summarized the situation after Boumediene.276  “[L]ast week’s Boumediene
decision makes it all but certain that Gitmo will soon be shutting (or 
should we say opening) its doors. . . . [T]he U.S. military is likely to
transfer an increasing number of captured terrorists to local prison 
authorities, if only to avoid the endless judicial landmines it can expect
trying to win convictions in U.S. court. . . .”277  Guantanamo’s closure
will itself result in exposing detainee abuse and torture in two ways. 
First, released detainees will be able to tell their stories to the press.
Second, many detainees may undergo medical examinations, which may
well document objective evidence of abuse.  Medical examinations of 
former terrorism suspects has already “found proof of physical and
psychological torture resulting in long term damage” according to a 
report by Physicians for Human Rights.278 
D. The President Lost Sole Power to Interpret           
Geneva Conventions 
The MCA purported to give the President the final authority to
determine the meaning and application of the Geneva Conventions. 
This, had it held, would have excluded courts from what has heretofore 
274. Michael Abramowitz, Critics Study Possible Limits to Habeas Corpus Ruling, 
WASH. POST, June 14, 2008, at A5. 
275. See, e.g., Administration Overreaching Blamed for SCOTUS Gitmo Ruling, 
BULLETIN’S FRONTRUNNER, June 16, 2008, available at Lexis News Library, Wire Serv.
Stories File. 
276. Id. (quoting Editorial, Taliban Habeas Corpus, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2008, 
(editorial was not a fan of the opinion going on to say, “to the extent that the Supreme 
Court has made secure detentions more difficult, it has made the task of our troops more
dangerous”)).
277. Id.
 278. Deborah Charles, Exams Show Torture of U.S.-Held Detainees-Report, REUTERS, 
June 18, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN18187793. 
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been a quintessential legal question—the meaning and application of a
particular kind of law—treaty law.279 
The Supreme Court has, since Marbury v. Madison280 in 1803, 
consistently held that it is the province of the courts to say what the law 
is. Indeed, the majority in Boumediene mentioned this well-established
principle.281  The rule that the courts are the final arbiters of what the law
is applies to construction of treaties.282 The courts are, therefore, unlikely 
to cede the sole power of treaty interpretation in the case of an important
treaty such as the Geneva Conventions.  The availability of habeas 
corpus gives the courts a mechanism by which a question concerning the 
construction of the Geneva Conventions could potentially come before 
the courts. 
Thus, in a proper case, a federal habeas court could review the
President’s determination of the meaning or application as a matter of 
law of the Geneva Conventions, and that issue could percolate on to the 
appellate courts and finally the Supreme Court.  Thus, notwithstanding
the Boumediene Court’s statement that it was only overruling the habeas
stripping portions of the MCA, the opinion calls into question, and 
arguably overrules sub silentio the grant of exclusive authority on the
part of the President to determine the meaning and application of the 
Geneva Conventions. The administration by reinstating Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions thus avoids a potential confrontation with the
courts. Again, Boumediene provided political and legal cover. 
Moreover, because of Boumediene, any president will be less likely to 
provide aggressive interpretations of the Geneva Conventions. If 
Boumediene acts as a deterrent to odd or overly restrictive interpretations 
of these international treaties, it may have succeeded in bringing the U.S.
into line with international opinion without any confrontation with the 
courts. 
279. That a treaty constitutes law is found directly in the Constitution:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
280. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
281. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2235–36. 
282. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346–47 (2006). 
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E. President Loses the Exclusive Power to Define Torture 
The MCA also gave the President the unilateral and unreviewable
power to establish interrogation methods.  As pointed out above, under
the DTA the President can effectively define, by negative inference, 
what constitutes torture. Boumediene calls this into question. Is what
constitutes torture a legal question? Presumably, the War Crimes Act
makes this a legal question, and if this is true then presumably a court 
could hold, in an appropriate case, that presidentially approved interrogation
methods constitute torture as a matter of law, thus rendering evidence or
a confession inadmissible.  Granted, a court would give great weight to 
presidential determination,283 but that determination would not be
dispositive. Boumediene, then, without mentioning the issue, potentially 
negates this part of the MCA. This again is likely to result in mollifying 
world opinion that, for the most part, has reacted negatively to U.S. use 
of torture in the war on terror.284  It also plainly provides additional
political cover to the decision to abjure torture in favor of more humane 
interrogation techniques285 
F. Importance of the Case Internationally 
International pressure had, even before Boumediene, already embarrassed 
the U.S. and made Guantanamo’s closure desirable.  Now the reason for 
its existence is gone.  Contrary to the OLC’s arguments it is not a law-
free zone devoid of the U.S. Constitution, the primary reason for sending 
alien “enemy combatants” to a place beyond the reach of U.S. courts has 
evaporated. Its closure will do much to mute international criticism and 
will bring the U.S. closer to international consensus on international
human rights law and international humanitarian law. Moreover, 
international opinion played a role in Bush’s political weakness in that 
many Americans are aware of world opinion and the problems that this 
creates for the U.S.  This in turn undercut the impetus for many of the 
positions advocated by the Bush Administration and arguably hurt his 
case.  International pressure may have played an unacknowledged role in
Boumediene. 
Furthermore, international legal opinion played a role in Boumediene. 
Many international scholars participated in amicus briefs, some of which 
appeared to be highly influential.  The majority opinion specifically
mentions the Brief of Legal Historians (which includes international 
283. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252. 
284. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d. at 465–66. 
285. See sources cited supra note 224. 
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scholars) saying their “expertise in legal history the Court has relied
upon in the past.”  Like it or not, (and there are some that bridle at any 
international influence on U.S. law) international legal scholarship is 
likely to play an increasingly important role in U.S. jurisprudence. 
While this case did not go so far as to address the issue of whether the 
Geneva Conventions are self-executing, it does have the effect of
avoiding the necessity of determining that issue.  It leaves in place Rasul 
v. Bush’s holding that the Geneva Conventions apply to Guantanamo
detainees through the Uniform Military Code of Justice.  Although 
international law was not mentioned in the majority opinion, it is 
increasingly playing a background role in Justice Kennedy’s thinking.286 
Boumediene neatly obviates the necessity for determining whether the 
Geneva Conventions are self-executing while undercutting the
President’s ability to define its protections away.  Thus, Rasul’s holding 
that the Geneva Conventions apply continues, unless expressly 
overridden by Congress, and the extension of the writ of habeas corpus
gives the courts the opportunity to police those issues.  This returns the 
U.S. to potentially full compliance with international law.  Given Justice 
Kennedy’s well-known sensitivity to these sorts of issues287 it seems 
plausible that international law played an unacknowledged role in
Boumediene. 
G. Does Boumediene Apply More Broadly Than 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?
On April 2, 2009 District Judge John D. Bates ruled in Maqaleh 
v. Gates288 that Boumediene applies to at least some detainees in U.S. 
custody at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan.  He concluded that 
the Constitution’s suspension clause applied to those detainees at
Bagram who did not have Afghan citizenship or who were not captured
there.  Moreover, the judge felt that the record was insufficiently
286. Justice Kennedy has long had a strong connection to judges and lawyers 
internationally and Jeffrey Toobin describes him as having a “passion for foreign law.” 
Swing Shift, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, lawhttp://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/ 
09/12/050912fa_fact.  He has taught at the Salzburg International Study program and he 
also teaches in the summers at the McGeorge School of Law’s summer sessions in 
Salzburg. His opinion in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) is noted in part for its 
invocation of international law. 
287. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2003);  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
576 (2005).
288. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 208 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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developed to determine whether the fourth petitioner—an Afghan 
citizen—might also be entitled to the remedy of habeas corpus on other
grounds.  The Obama administration has announced its intention to
appeal,289 and it is too soon to know whether Boumediene will extend 
beyond Guantanamo Bay’s special circumstances.  If it turns out that 
detainees have limited rights to constitutional habeas corpus anywhere in
the world, then Boumediene becomes even more important as it then 
potentially affects future conflicts. 
XI. CONCLUSION
The CIA has destroyed videotapes of interrogations.290 We know
that military judges have already classified witness names wholesale,
without specific evidence of necessity, and that defense lawyers have 
been denied access to available witnesses already in custody at 
Guantanamo.  We have seen political influence repeatedly distort the 
process and Combatant Status Review Tribunals convened and reconvened 
and reconvened until they at last return the “correct” verdict.  We know 
what coerced statements “not rising to the level of torture” look like to
the CIA and even to the U.S. military. 
How unlikely, given this unpromising history, would our hypothetical 
scenarios be absent Boumediene’s extraordinary holdings?  Would the 
hearsay rule, allowing double, triple, or even quadruple hearsay combine 
with ex parte and in camera proceedings and the derivative use of torture
evidence to cloak interrogations using torture? Duke professor Curtis
Bradley,291 along with the Chief Justice Robert’s dissent in Boumediene, 
appears to believe that the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit could 
have sorted these issues out and that this process adequately substitutes 
for habeas corpus. Other scholars questioned that assumption,292 and the
Supreme Court majority agrees that the CSRT process is fatally flawed. 
Contrary to the views of Professor Bradley and Chief Justice Roberts,
it does not appear that justice would have been served, or that truth 
would have been revealed by the system devised by Congress.  Instead, 
what we see was an Administration determined to cloak its misdeeds. We
289. Andrew Gilmore, Obama administration to appeal Bagram detainees habeas 
ruling, JURIST, Apr. 11, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/04/obama-
administration- to-appeal-bagram.php. 
290. See supra notes 147–1151 and related text. 
291. See generally, Bradley, supra note 174. 
292. See, e.g., Farer, supra note 183, at 363; Jack M. Beard, The Geneva Boomerang: 
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and U.S. Counterterror Operations, 101 AM. J.
INT’L L. 56 (2007); Martin, supra note 117, at 322; Guénaël Mettraux, Comparing the
Comparable: 2006 Military Commissions v. the ICTY, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 59 (2007);
Greenberger, supra note 200, at 805; Vázquez, supra note 174, at 73 (2007). 
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also saw governmental agencies including the military, the intelligence 
services, and the Department of Justice caving in to political pressure 
and assisting in evading the truth even at the expense of detainees, at 
least some of whom were wholly innocent yet indefinitely incarcerated,
and none of whom deserved to be tortured or subjected to cruel and
inhumane treatment.  Most importantly, the government had rules in 
place that made it very easy for the government to hide torture. 
Congresses’ solution to the detainee problem could not have sorted itself
out, and could not have reached just resolutions in individual cases,
without help from the Supreme Court in Boumediene. 
The MCA has the effect of directing lower-level administrators and
military personnel not only to hide these unpleasant truths from the 
public but from themselves as well.  It would be very easy for a 
bureaucrat with a narrow perspective to miss the “torture culture”
completely, to see a limited and seemingly benign part.  People of good 
faith would run the system, oblivious, for the most part, to its ugly
consequences. 
Even those who do the actual torturing tend to minimize and
rationalize the system as it is.  As both Stanley Milgram293 and Phillip
Zimbardo’s294 experiments have taught, otherwise normal people can,
given the situation, do some surprisingly harsh things.  The prison guards in
Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment were well on their way to 
constructing a “torture culture” before the experiment was ended as a 
result of ethical concerns.  These were normal students, indistinguishable
from each other, picked by a completely random process.  They were no
different from young people who join the military, the police, or our
intelligence services everyday. 
Abusive practices start at the top and become a part of a culture that
pulls in ordinary people.  People caught up in such cultures do things 
that they would never have thought themselves to be capable of.  Until
Boumediene, the MCA helped to create and continue at Guantanamo
Bay just this sort of situation; it perpetuates itself by blinding most of its 
participants from its consequences, while co-opting a sufficient number
to make the “torture culture” work.  The MCA created an impenetrable
 293. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TOAUTHORITY:AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (2004).
294. PHILLIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE
TURN EVIL (2007). 
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cloaking device that only civilian courts, with the power to admit
evidence from a variety of sources, can pierce.
The prison experiment at Stanford quickly created great anguish.
Zimbardo ended it after six days.  Detainees have been at Guantanamo
nearly six years, without so much as one full hearing on the merits.  How 
much longer will they wait for the “torture culture” to end?  Well before 
the presidential election Boumediene foreshadowed an end to the U.S.
torture culture.  It also provided political and legal cover and made 
inevitable that which many in the human rights and international
communities had been advocating—a return to the rule of law and a 
foreswearing of torture and other harsh interrogation practices.
134
